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CHOICE AT WORK: YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, 
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION, AND REPRODUCTIVE 
LIBERTY 
MARY ZIEGLER† 
ABSTRACT 
In deciding Young v. United Parcel Service, the Supreme Court has 
intervened in ongoing struggles about when and whether the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) requires the accommodation of preg-
nant workers. Drawing on original archival research, this Article histori-
cizes Young, arguing that the PDA embodied a limited principle of what 
the Article calls meaningful reproductive choice. Feminist litigators first 
forged such an idea in the early 1970s, arguing that heightened judicial 
scrutiny should apply whenever state actors placed special burdens on 
women who chose childbirth or abortion.  
A line of Supreme Court decisions completely rejected this under-
standing of reproductive liberty. However, choice arguments rejected in 
the juridical arena flourished in Congress, during debate about the PDA. 
For a variety of strategic and ideological reasons, legal feminists and 
antiabortion activists turned to legislative constitutionalism to give mean-
ing to the idea of reproductive liberty. While not requiring employers to 
provide any accommodations, the PDA prohibited employers from plac-
ing special burdens on women’s procreative decisions.  
The history of the meaningful-choice principle suggests that while 
the Court reached the right outcome, Young still falls short of providing 
women the protection intended by the framers of the PDA. By a 6-3 vote, 
the Court vacated a Fourth Circuit decision vindicating United Parcel 
Service’s “pregnancy-blind” employment policy—that is, the policy ef-
fectively excluded pregnant workers but did not formally categorize 
them on the basis of pregnancy. In its application of the McDonnell-
Douglas burden-shifting analysis, Young removed some of the obstacles 
previously faced by pregnant workers relying on disparate treatment the-
ories. However, the Court still assumes that employers could have legit-
imate reasons for discriminating against pregnant workers beyond their 
ability to do a job, creating precisely the kind of burdens on reproductive 
decision-making that the PDA was supposed to eliminate. 
  
 † Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College 
of Law. She would like to thank Courtney Cahill, Kristin Collins, Deborah Dinner, Serena Mayeri, 
and Tracy Thomas for agreeing to share their thoughts on this piece. 
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The history of the meaningful-choice principle strengthens the ar-
guments against pregnancy-blind policies that are available after Young, 
including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and disability accommo-
dation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Ultimately, however, 
the history studied here shows that the promise of litigation after Young 
may well still be limited. Legislation, rather than litigation, may be the 
most promising path for expanding protections for pregnant women. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recently deciding Young v. United Parcel Service,1 the Supreme 
Court has intervened in ongoing struggles about when and whether the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) requires the accommoda-
  
 1. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young II), 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).  
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tion of pregnant workers.2 In Young, a United Parcel Service (UPS) em-
ployee asked for a light-work assignment after her doctor advised her not 
to lift more than twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of pregnancy.3 
UPS refused, citing a company policy of accommodating only employees 
covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), workers who 
lost driving certification from the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
or workers injured on the job.4 UPS’s policy stands as a prominent ex-
ample of the “pregnancy-blind” policies previously approved by many 
federal circuit courts—policies that exclude all pregnant workers without 
formally classifying on the basis of pregnancy.5 The Supreme Court va-
cated the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Young, transforming the legal land-
scape surrounding pregnancy-blind policies.6  
Drawing on original archival research, this Article historicizes 
Young, revealing the promise and limits of the Court’s decision. While 
the Court removed some of the practical obstacles in the way of chal-
lenges to pregnancy-blind policies, Young still fails to capture one of the 
purposes underlying the PDA—preventing employers from placing spe-
cial burdens on women’s procreative decisions. The PDA embodied a 
limited principle of what the Article calls meaningful reproductive 
choice—a guarantee that women would have neither special protections 
nor special burdens placed on their reproductive decisions. By ignoring 
this principle, Young may sometimes allow employers to ignore the 
mandate of the PDA. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates Young historically, 
chronicling the successful legislative constitutional project pursued by 
the proponents of the PDA. The idea of meaningful choice embodied in 
the PDA first took shape in the early 1970s when feminist litigators ar-
gued that heightened judicial scrutiny applied when the State placed spe-
cial burdens on women either because they chose to bring a pregnancy to 
term or to terminate it. More ambitiously, some feminists suggested that 
the State may have to act to affirmatively support some fundamental 
rights.  
  
 2. For examples of court decisions elaborating on pregnancy-blindness theory under Title 
VII, see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young I), 707 F.3d 437, 447–51 (4th Cir. 2013), amend-
ed and superseded by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, subsequent determination, 
2015 WL 2058940 (2015); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548–49 (7th Cir. 
2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., 
Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207–
08 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 3. Young I, 707 F.3d at 441. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 6. Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
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A line of Supreme Court decisions completely rejected this under-
standing of reproductive liberty.7 However, choice arguments rejected in 
the juridical arena flourished in Congress during debate about the PDA. 
For a variety of strategic and ideological reasons, legal feminists and 
antiabortion activists turned to the legislative arena to give meaning to 
the idea of reproductive liberty. While not requiring employers to pro-
vide any accommodations, the PDA prohibited employers from placing 
special burdens on women’s procreative decisions.  
As Part I shows, the story of the PDA makes apparent the trans-
formative potential of choice arguments widely derided by academic 
commentators. The history presented here reveals the lost potential and 
complexity of choice arguments, particularly outside the abortion con-
text. These claims allowed feminists to flesh out the relationship between 
poverty and reproductive healthcare. Significantly, such arguments also 
helped to build an influential, if troubled, coalition between women on 
opposing sides of the abortion issue.  
Part II examines the reasons for the decline of meaningful-choice 
arguments. Starting in the late 1970s, as abortion opponents scored victo-
ries in Congress and the states, and as Ronald Reagan successfully popu-
larized arguments centered on small government and individualism, fem-
inists sought out a more compelling justification for abortion rights. In 
the process, commentators and activists highlighted the shortcomings of 
framing reproductive rights as a matter of privacy or choice.  
Drawing on the history of the meaningful-choice principle, Part III 
evaluates contemporary judicial interpretations of the PDA, including 
both the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit’s opinions in Young. Prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Young, the federal circuit courts gener-
ally upheld pregnancy-blind policies—employer rules that excluded 
pregnant workers but did not facially discriminate against them.8 In 
Young, the Supreme Court rejected both the employer and the employ-
ee’s interpretations of the PDA.9 UPS argued that the PDA had nothing 
to do with accommodation, simply adding pregnancy to the protected 
classes covered by Title VII.10 By contrast, Peggy Young claimed that 
  
 7. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–26 (1980) (rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to a federal ban on publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478–80 (1977) 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to state ban on publicly funded abortions); General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142–46 (1976) (rejecting a challenge to a pregnancy exclusion under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), superseded by statute as recognized in General Electric Company 
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974) (rejecting an 
equal-protection challenge to the exclusion of pregnancy in California state disability policy), super-
seded by statute as recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 
669 (1983). 
 8. For examples of court decisions elaborating on pregnancy-blindness theory under Title 
VII, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 9. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–54. 
 10. Brief for Respondent at 11–12, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12–1226). 
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the PDA required employers accommodating any employee to offer 
similar protections to pregnant workers so long as they were “similar in 
their ability or inability to work.”11 Finding neither interpretation persua-
sive, the Court focused on how employees could demonstrate disparate 
treatment.12 Whereas challenges to pregnancy-blind policies previously 
failed at the prima facie case stage,13 under Young, a policy treating 
pregnant workers differently from other workers similar in their inability 
to work may help a worker make out a prima facie case of discrimination 
under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green’s14 burden-shifting frame-
work.15 Young also changed how employees could rebut an employer’s 
proffered, neutral reason for discrimination. The Court laid out factors to 
balance in evaluating pretext, namely, the burden a policy imposed 
against pregnant workers and the employer’s compelling reasons for 
exclusion.16 Again, Young makes it easier for pregnant workers to prove 
pretext, requiring employers to offer more convincing explanations for 
policies that leave out all or most pregnant workers.17 
Other scholars have explained how decisions vindicating pregnan-
cy-blind policies ignore the history of the PDA’s antidiscrimination 
mandate.18 However, this Article breaks new ground by showing that 
Young only partly remedied the errors of lower court decisions on preg-
nancy-blind policies. The PDA wrote into law an intermovement consen-
sus that reproductive liberty required more than freedom from state inter-
ference. To be sure, the PDA only partly embraced the constitutional 
commitments of pro-lifers and feminists. The law did not clearly require 
  
 11. Petitioner’s Brief at 3–4, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12–1226) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2012)).  
 12. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–55. 
 13. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work  Overcom-
ing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 36–
37 (2009) (describing court decisions of this kind). 
 14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 15. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–55. 
 16. Id. at 1353–55. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 
STETSON L. REV. 1, 27–32 (1995); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction  History and the 
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 483–84 (2011) (explaining 
that pregnancy blindness arguments do “not recognize two lessons that we may glean from historical 
debates about the costs of reproduction”); Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise 
of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 614–15 (2010) (criticizing the pregnancy-blindness line of 
cases); Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 49–50; Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux  The 
Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 978–1004, 1022 (2013). Other studies explore the best legal solutions to 
the problem of pregnancy discrimination. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference  The 
Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 21–37 (1985) (generally supporting pregnancy-
specific benefits); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy  Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
513, 538–62 (1983) (generally supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); Christine A. Little-
ton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1052–59 (1987) (generally 
supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the 
Workplace  Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2214–20 
(1994) (proposing an insurance system for pregnancy leave). 
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employers to accommodate any employees, including pregnant women.19 
Just the same, as this Article argues, if an employer elected to accommo-
date any worker, the mandate of the PDA made clear that employers had 
a duty to provide pregnant women with the accommodations available to 
those with a similar physical capacity to work. By requiring only preg-
nancy-blind policies, the courts have allowed employers to burden wom-
en’s reproductive decisions in precisely the way the PDA sought to pre-
vent.  
The history considered here supports the outcome in Young, ques-
tions core premises of the decision, and strengthens the case against 
pregnancy-blind policies in the courts under a variety of theories, includ-
ing disparate impact and disability accommodation under the ADA.20 
Just the same, historical context exposes the limitations of litigating for 
pregnant workers. In the future, as in the past, legislation, rather than 
litigation, may prove to be a more promising path for women seeking 
protection against pregnancy discrimination.  
I. CREATING A RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL CHOICE 
Young figures centrally not only in the evolving story of employ-
ment discrimination law but also in the evolution of arguments about the 
meaning of reproductive liberty. In the 1970s, as the Article shows, fem-
inists and certain abortion opponents rallied around an idea of choice at 
work, contending that the government could not constitutionally burden 
one reproductive choice available to women more than another. By the 
end of the 1970s, in cases involving pregnancy, disability, and abortion, 
the Supreme Court cast doubt on the validity of this approach, particular-
ly in the context of reproductive liberty.21 At first, it seems that decisions 
like Geduldig v. Aiello22 and Maher v. Roe23 hollowed out protections of 
  
 19. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 18, at 464 (“The text and legislative history of the PDA did 
not clarify whether the PDA requires, or even allows, measures beyond equal treatment to accom-
modate pregnancy and childbirth.”). 
 20. Under Title VII, disparate treatment cases prohibit intentional discrimination against a 
member of the protected class on the part of the employer and her agents. See, e.g., Michelle A. 
Travis, The PDA’s Causation Effect  Observations of an Unreasonable Woman, 21 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 51, 64 (2009) (“In disparate treatment claims, pregnant women allege that their employers 
intentionally took an adverse action against them because of their pregnancy.”). By contrast, dispar-
ate impact cases ask whether a facially neutral employment practice has an unjustifiably dispropor-
tionate impact on members of a protected class unless that practice is “‘job-related’ and ‘consistent 
with business necessity.’” Id. at 70–72 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012)). The ADA 
and the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAA) mandate that “[n]o covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in hiring, firing, compen-
sation, training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(2012). A “qualified individual” with a disability is one who “with or without reasonable accommo-
dation, can perform the essential functions” of a job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The ADA and ADAA 
require that employers reasonably accommodate their disabled employees as part of its nondiscrimi-
nation scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 21. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 22. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 23. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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reproductive liberty. Geduldig held that pregnancy discrimination did not 
count as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause,24 while 
Maher concluded that states could choose to fund childbirth, but not 
abortion, without running afoul of the privacy right recognized in Roe.25 
These decisions blocked efforts to flesh out the relationship between 
reproductive liberty and equality; Geduldig ratified sex stereotypes sur-
rounding pregnancy and undermined any challenge to them, and Maher 
upheld laws banning the use of public monies for abortion, reasoning that 
the right to privacy did not entitle women to the means to exercise their 
rights.26 These decisions stood in the way of attempts to recognize rights 
to state support as well as freedoms from state intervention.27 
However, as this Part argues, Geduldig and Maher did not undercut 
efforts to secure meaningful reproductive choice. Instead, failures in the 
courts forced legal feminists and pro-life activists to express their consti-
tutional commitments in the legislative arena. 
This Part charts the evolution of meaningful-choice arguments, be-
ginning with their development in pregnancy disability litigation in the 
early 1970s. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,28 femi-
nists developed an argument that substantive due process limited the 
State’s ability to burden reproductive decision-making.29 Some went 
further, suggesting that in the case of certain crucial rights, the govern-
ment had to ensure that individuals could effectuate the rights they had.30 
As the Part examines next, the Supreme Court ultimately found the-
se arguments unconvincing. Just the same, the Part shows that in the bat-
tle for the PDA, pro-life and abortion-rights activists rejected the Court’s 
understanding of reproductive privacy, insisting that meaningful choice 
existed only when the government protected women from workplace 
discrimination and the burdens of poverty. These arguments helped to 
shape the PDA and influenced some of its most powerful supporters in 
  
 24. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495–96. 
 25. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474–75. 
 26. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 18, at 467 (“The majority opinion in Geduldig reflected an 
emerging reluctance, in both the race and the sex contexts, to interpret the constitutional prohibition 
on discrimination to reach structural inequality as well as discriminatory intent.”); Sylvia A. Law, 
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 985 (1984) (“Geduldig has made it 
more difficult to claim that reproductive freedom is an aspect of sex-based equality.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice  The Contri-
butions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights 
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 725, 748–50 (1981); Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and 
Compulsory Maternity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 759 & n.39 (“[A] Constitution of nega-
tive rights does not require the government to fund the exercise of positive rights.”). 
 28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
343, 404–05 (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the Ameri-
can Public Health Ass’n, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., the National Organization 
for Women and Certain Medical School Deans, Professors and Individual Physicians at 11–12, 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440). 
226 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1  
Congress. Significantly, as embodied in the PDA, this reasoning stands 
in obvious tension with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young and the 
federal courts’ embrace of pregnancy blindness. 
A. Feminists Bridge the Gap Between Poverty Law and Reproductive 
Liberty 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, to an unprecedented extent, the 
welfare rights movement challenged the constitutional distinction be-
tween a right and a privilege.31 Grassroots activists organized groups like 
the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and demanded not 
only fair procedures governing welfare benefits but also asserted a right 
to live connected to state support.32 Similar arguments caught on in the 
legal academy. Citing the “increasing size of government as an economic 
unit,” Professor William Van Alstyne called for the abolition of the right-
privilege distinction in the context of certain state-created “privileges” 
involving employment, housing, income replacement, and food stamps.33 
Charles Reich’s “new property” theory proposed that certain govern-
ment-created statuses—such as professional licenses and public bene-
fits—should count as forms of property protected by the Due Process 
Clause—property that could be taken away only after a benefits-holder 
took advantage of crucial procedural protections.34 Welfare rights propo-
nents like Frank Michelman interrogated the distinction between positive 
and negative rights, suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment might 
actually guarantee some minimum standard of living for the poor.35  
As feminists began to explore the limits of reproductive liberty, they 
echoed the reasoning of Supreme Court cases that fueled poverty law-
yers’ demands for positive rights: Shapiro v. Thompson36 and Dandridge 
v. Williams.37 In Griswold v. Connecticut38 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,39 the 
  
 31. See, e.g., Brenna Binns, Fencing Out the Poor  The Constitutionality of Residency Re-
quirements in Welfare Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (“As a result of the welfare rights 
movement, the Court gave welfare litigation higher scrutiny and recognized welfare benefits as a 
right, rather than a privilege, of the poor.”). 
 32. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 76 (1993); FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: 
POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 143 (2007). 
 33. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional 
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442, 1461–62 (1968). 
 34. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734, 783–84 (1964). 
 35. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword  On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9–13 (1969). For further discussion of the history of the welfare 
rights movement, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 32; KORNBLUH, supra note 32; PREMILLA 
NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2005). On the history of welfare rights litigation in the Supreme Court, see, for example, 
ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND 
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997). 
 36. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 37. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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Supreme Court had suggested that the Constitution offered some protec-
tion for crucial decisions involving reproduction.40 By turning to poverty 
law, some feminists asked whether reproductive liberty was among the 
“rights . . . so fundamental that the state must provide . . . the means to 
exercise them.”41 
These efforts began in the litigation of Dandridge itself, a case in-
volving a constitutional challenge to Maryland’s maximum-grant law.42 
The statute capped payments under the state’s Aid to Dependent Families 
with Children regardless of the size of a beneficiary’s family.43 While the 
Maryland law did nothing to stop women from having children, the max-
imum-grant policy penalized those with larger families.44 The Dandridge 
appellees argued before the Supreme Court that such a penalty violated 
the Constitution: 
This Court has left no doubt that, while under certain exceptional cir-
cumstances infringement, by government, of this right of procreation 
and marital privacy will be upheld, it constitutes impermissible invid-
ious discrimination to discourage one class of individuals from exer-
cising these basic rights while zealously safeguarding the exercise of 
those rights by others similarly situated.45 
When the Court decided Dandridge, the justices made no mention 
of fundamental rights to procreate, indeed retreating from positions taken 
in earlier poverty-law decisions.46 Dandridge rejected poverty lawyers’ 
challenge to the Maryland maximum grant law, but in spite of the deci-
sion, the premise of the appellees’ brief—that some form of heightened 
scrutiny ought to apply to laws that burdened procreative rights—
inspired legal feminists intent on testing the boundaries of reproductive 
liberty.47 
Prior to 1974, these arguments figured centrally in the litigation of 
discriminatory leave policies affecting public school teachers and Air 
  
 40. On the state of the privacy right in the aftermath of Eisenstadt, see DAVID J. GARROW, 
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 542–97 
(1994). 
 41. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the American 
Public Health Ass’n, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., the National Organization for 
Women and Certain Medical School Deans, Professors and Individual Physicians at 11–12, Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440) [hereinafter Annexed Brief]. 
 42. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473. 
 43. Id. at 473–74. 
 44. See id. at 473–75 
 45. Brief for Appellees at 32, Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (No. 131) (footnote omitted). 
 46. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–66 (1970). Dandridge rejected challenges 
to the Maryland law involving both the federal Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 482–83, 486–87. 
 47. On the history of these efforts, see Dinner, supra note 18, at 445–47, 449–57. For more on 
LaFleur and reproductive liberty, see Tracy A. Thomas, The Struggle for Gender Equality in the 
Northern District of Ohio, in JUSTICE AND LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 165, 165–
83 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander eds., 2012). 
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Force service personnel, including Struck v. Secretary of Defense,48 a 
case famously litigated by ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg.49 In her 
brief in Struck, Ginsburg contended: 
The discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation, 
barring pregnant women and mothers from continued service in the 
Air Force, reflects the discredited notion that a woman who becomes 
pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home to await 
childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of 
this outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally encroaches 
upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.50  
Other pregnancy discrimination cases elaborated on Ginsburg’s 
claim that discriminatory policies unconstitutionally burdened women’s 
substantive due process rights. In Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur,51 Jane Picker and her colleagues challenged a maternity leave 
policy requiring schoolteachers to take eight months of leave without 
pay.52 Picker argued that “[t]he waiting period in LaFleur thus penal-
ize[d] Respondents’ fundamental right to bear children.”53  
These arguments represented an early form of what the Article calls 
meaningful-choice reasoning. Even if hirers had no constitutional duty to 
assist women seeking to effectuate their procreative rights, feminists 
argued that the Equal Protection Clause prevented employers from con-
ditioning a woman’s economic security on her surrender of procreative 
rights.54 Insofar as the Constitution protected reproductive liberty, em-
ployers could not force women to choose between bearing children and 
attaining the economic security available to other workers. When the 
courts identified such an unfair choice, heightened judicial scrutiny 
should apply. 
More ambitiously, legal feminists joined poverty lawyers in ques-
tioning the logic underlying the right-privilege distinction in constitu-
tional law. In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the dis-
tinction between a protected right and a mere privilege.55 In McAuliffe v. 
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 51. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
 52. Brief for Respondents at 44, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (No. 72-
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 53. Id. at 45. 
 54. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 50–56, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178). 
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City of New Bedford,56 Holmes rejected the claim of a policeman, who 
had been fired for violating a law restricting certain political activities: 
“The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has 
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”57 In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the right-privilege distinction came under fire, as legal academics 
and attorneys sought to carve out exceptions to it.58 Feminist litigators 
hinted at the existence of a hierarchy of constitutional rights: some were 
so fundamental that the State had an affirmative duty to guarantee their 
effectuation.59Feminists suggested that reproductive liberty might occupy 
a place at the top of that hierarchy of rights.60 
In the juridical arena, meaningful-choice arguments peaked during 
the litigation of Geduldig, a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
pregnancy exclusion in the California Disability Fund.61 Significantly, 
Geduldig came before the Supreme Court in the aftermath of Roe v. 
Wade. In that case, the Court had invalidated the abortion restrictions 
then on the books, suggesting that the constitutional right to privacy “is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy.”62 The Roe Court limited the abortion right in sever-
al ways: by assigning it at least equally to the woman’s physician and by 
creating a trimester framework that gave the states more regulatory au-
thority in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy.63 Just the same, 
legal feminists read their victory in LaFleur as an extension—and clarifi-
cation—of the right announced in Roe. In LaFleur, the Supreme Court 
had struck down an eight-month mandatory leave policy because it “em-
ploy[ed] irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a [woman] . . . 
for deciding to bear a child.”64 While resting on procedural due process, 
LaFleur fueled feminist arguments about the scope of reproductive liber-
ty.65 
Feminist attorney Wendy Webster Williams, who argued Geduldig 
before the Supreme Court, read LaFleur as an expansion of the liberty 
recognized in Roe.66 Citing LaFleur, Williams’s brief reasoned that 
“[t]he strict scrutiny test is applicable not only where the denial of a fun-
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damental right is absolute, but also where state regulation penalizes its 
free exercise.”67 In Williams’s account, pregnancy discrimination count-
ed as the kind of penalty on reproductive choice forbidden by the Consti-
tution: 
Unlike any other disabled worker in the State of California covered 
by the state disability insurance program, the woman who suffers a 
disability in connection with her pregnancy is left to bear the eco-
nomic consequences of her inability to work. As a result of her preg-
nancy, a woman faces medical bills, the possible cost of temporary 
help and, if her pregnancy is successfully concluded, a new child to 
support at the very time she is unable to bring home wages to pay for 
these expenses. . . . The denial of benefits available to other workers 
therefore constitutes a substantial burden upon her exercise of her 
right to bear a child and the State must demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in its classification.68
An ACLU brief co-signed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg similarly con-
cluded that Roe and LaFleur had transformed reproductive liberty: 
Under due process principles, the state is required to show that a 
compelling interest justifies the substantial burden placed upon exer-
cise of the fundamental freedom to decide whether to bear a child. 
Appellant has not demonstrated any such compelling interest; there-
fore the treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities violates the due 
process clause.69 
Roe had recognized that “the decision whether to continue or to 
terminate a pregnancy . . . must be left up to the individual . . . lest the 
state unconstitutionally intrude into the zone of privacy protected by the 
Constitution.”70 LaFleur further narrowed the State’s power to regulate 
reproductive liberty insofar as it “recognized that this zone of privacy 
with respect to child bearing is unconstitutionally infringed by govern-
mental action which has the effect of burdening women who chose to 
continue pregnancy rather than terminate it.”71
Geduldig represented an important opportunity for legal feminists 
seeking a more robust jurisprudence of reproductive liberty. Feminists 
highlighted the particularly harsh impact of pregnancy discrimination on 
poor women—an argument carried forward in challenges to state bans on 
the Medicaid funding of abortion.72 For example, in Klein v. Nassau 
  
 67. Id. at 53. 
 68. Id. at 53–54. 
 69. Brief Amici Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 7, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 
484 (1974) (No. 73-640). 
 70. Id. at 25. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 
121 (2015). 
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County Medical Center,73 a federal district court struck down a directive 
prohibiting the use of Medicaid funding for abortion, explaining that 
women choosing abortion “alone are subjected to State coercion to bear 
children which they do not wish to bear.”74 Constitutionally, as Klein 
recognized, Medicaid bans imposed the same kind of impermissible con-
dition at work in Geduldig, denying a woman “medical assistance unless 
she resigns her freedom of choice and bears the child.”75 Together, abor-
tion and pregnancy disability litigation promised to entrench a much 
broader understanding of reproductive liberty. 
B. The Supreme Court Rejects Meaningful Choice 
The Supreme Court rejected the expansive understanding of choice 
advanced by feminists, adopting the position staked out by both business 
organizations and some abortion opponents. In Geduldig, industry groups 
and corporations had argued that, under Roe and LaFleur, pregnancy had 
become a choice controlled entirely by a woman—something entirely 
different from the illnesses and injuries often covered by disability poli-
cies.76 For example, in an amicus brief in Geduldig, the General Electric 
Company, a company that did not cover pregnancy under its disability 
policy, argued: 
Thus pregnancy, unlike any sickness or accident, results from the 
cumulative, four-fold exercise of free will necessary for a woman to 
bear a child: (1) there must be a voluntary decision to marry, as mar-
riage still reflects by far the current standard of morality; (2) the cou-
ple must elect to have sexual intercourse—a two-person decision; (3) 
the couple must elect that conception will result—i.e., must elect to 
reject the various alternative methods available for avoiding pregnan-
cy; and (4) if conception takes place, the couple must elect to accept 
the pregnancy and have the baby, and not to terminate the pregnancy 
by abortion. It should also be noted that even for the unmarried, the 
latter three choices are viable alternatives to the pregnant state.77  
As General Electric understood it, women already enjoyed true re-
productive liberty. As a result, women could not fairly expect an em-
ployer to subsidize their procreative decisions, particularly since other 
workers could not enjoy the same benefits.78  
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Later in the 1970s, antiabortion attorneys borrowed from this vision 
of choice in defending Medicaid funding bans. Defending such a funding 
restriction in Connecticut, pro-life attorneys stressed that nothing in the 
law “prevent[ed] a woman from making a choice to have an abortion.”79 
The State’s responsibility ended with its duty not to prohibit abortion. 
Beyond that, women themselves bore the costs of indigence and lack of 
access to medical services. “[U]nder Roe,” pro-life attorneys explained in 
Maher, “an indigent woman was not given an additional fundamental 
right to have an abortion paid for from public funds.”80 
In both Geduldig and Maher, the Supreme Court thoroughly reject-
ed the meaningful-choice reasoning on which feminists had relied. De-
cided in 1974, Geduldig found that California’s disability policy did not 
discriminate on the basis of sex since there was “no risk from which men 
[were] protected and women [were] not.”81 Neither the majority nor the 
dissent mentioned the reproductive-liberty claims emphasized by femi-
nists.82 
While Geduldig failed to mention reproductive liberty, Maher, a 
case involving the constitutionality of bans on the public funding of 
abortion, suggested that abortion rights guaranteed only a right to be left 
alone.83 By conditioning the receipt of support on a woman’s surrender 
of her abortion right, Connecticut placed “no obstacles absolute or oth-
erwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”84 As Maher ex-
plained, “An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disad-
vantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; 
she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service 
she desires.”85 
Taken together, Maher and Geduldig limited the promise of repro-
ductive-liberty doctrine in the courts. In 1980, the Court confirmed its 
rejection of the doctrine in Harris v. McRae,86 upholding the Hyde 
Amendment, a federal ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion.87 
However, failure in the courts did not mark the end of efforts to ad-
vance meaningful-choice arguments. Indeed, after 1976, in General 
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Electric Company v. Gilbert,88 when the Court rejected arguments that 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited pregnancy discrimi-
nation,89 those on opposing sides of the abortion issue revived the consti-
tutional arguments for meaningful reproductive choice rejected by the 
Court, this time acting in the legislative arena.  
Significantly, in the later 1970s, antiabortion activists as well as 
feminists made some version of meaningful choice a centerpiece of their 
legal agenda. In the aftermath of the Roe decision, antiabortion leaders 
turned to a variety of constitutional strategies to outlaw most or all abor-
tions, including an Article V amendment campaign.90 In formulating 
these responses to Roe, pro-lifers defined a new class deserving protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment: vulnerable and dependent per-
sons.91 For the members of groups like American Citizens Concerned for 
Life (ACCL) and Feminists for Life, pregnant women fit this category 
perfectly.92 These pro-life activists recognized that some women turned 
to abortion because they faced sex discrimination at work.93 Poor women 
often faced an impossible choice between exercising procreative liberty 
and guaranteeing themselves economic security.94 Recognizing this di-
lemma, some pro-lifers presented protection from pregnancy discrimina-
tion as a precondition for meaningful reproductive choice.95 Conversely, 
when the government refused to ensure women protection from sex dis-
crimination, as pro-lifers argued, the government put unconstitutional 
burdens on women’s reproductive choice. Thoroughly rejected by the 
courts, this understanding of choice reappeared as a robust legislative 
constitutional norm—one on which activists deeply divided by the abor-
tion issue agreed. 
C. Pro-Lifers Work to Redefine Equal Protection of the Law 
From the outset, the pro-life movement defined its cause as a consti-
tutional one, based on a fundamental right they identified in the Four-
teenth Amendment.96 At the state and local level, pro-life organizations 
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mobilized in the late 1960s to preserve existing bans on abortion.97 
Groups like the Southern California Right to Life League, New York 
State Right to Life, and the Illinois Right to Life Committee chose names 
that referred to the “right to life” mentioned in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.98 The same constitutional commitment defined the pre-1973 
agendas of national organizations like the National Right to Life Com-
mittee (NRLC) and Americans United for Life (AUL). “Protecting the 
right to life of the unborn child,” the NRLC Statement of Purpose assert-
ed, “is a central issue to the National Right to Life Committee.”99 Simi-
larly, the AUL’s Declaration of Purpose similarly explained: “Believing 
with those who hold that all men are created equal, we proclaim that 
among our precious civil and natural liberties and rights is the responsi-
bility of society to safeguard the integral life of every human being from 
conception to natural death.”100  
Over the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, antiabortion ac-
tivists began to ground their normative commitments in existing constitu-
tional doctrine. Significantly, abortion opponents identified their cause 
with both substantive due process and equal protection doctrine.101 
Working in emerging national groups like the NRLC and the AUL, pro-
lifers forged an argument based on the overlap of liberty and equality 
norms, training their fire on laws that denied vulnerable groups the im-
plicit right to life.102 
Activists like Robert Byrn, a grassroots organizer and Fordham law 
professor, presented dependency as a classic suspect classification, and 
Byrn argued that abortion represented precisely the kind of invidious 
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to root 
out.103 In particular, Byrn compared fetuses to illegitimate children, a 
group afforded some protection by the Supreme Court in the late 
1960s.104 For example, in 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana,105 the Court had 
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first struck down an illegitimacy classification, explaining, “We start 
from the premise that illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are 
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’ within the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”106 
Byrn saw abortion as the type of discrimination that Levy con-
demned. Levy suggested that any child qualified as a legal person if she 
was human and alive107—criteria which, in Byrn’s view, clearly applied 
to the unborn child.108 The traits that differentiated the unborn child from 
other Americans—age, vulnerability, and dependency—made no consti-
tutional difference.109 Indeed, the dependent required additional constitu-
tional and other legal protections. Highlighting President Lyndon John-
son’s War on Poverty, Byrn insisted: “The more dependent and helpless 
a person is, the more solicitous the law is of his welfare.”110  
Like Byrn, other pro-lifers deployed a theory of equal liberty, insist-
ing that the Constitution recognized an implicit right to life that had to be 
equally available to the unborn child. For example, Martin McKernan of 
the NRLC emphasized: “All in all, the law has consistently established 
certain procedural safeguards around fundamental rights to which the 
unborn was entitled. That most fundamental of rights - not to be deprived 
of life without due process of the law - cannot be ignored.”111 
Activists like Byrn and McKernan did not address the ways in 
which unborn children did not resemble a suspect class: there was no 
obvious history of discrimination against fetuses, and neither age nor 
dependency was immutable—as Byrn acknowledged, both represented 
phases experienced by every citizen who reached adulthood.112 Moreo-
ver, like some gender distinctions, physical disability and dependency 
could constitute real biological differences.113 From the standpoint of 
conventional equal protection law, a fetus may not be similarly situated 
to a child, and a person in a persistent vegetative state may not be com-
parable to a legally competent adult. 
While claiming that protections for unborn children fit within a 
conventional equal-protection framework, pro-lifers like Byrn actually 
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demanded a bold reconceptualization of the doctrine. Conventional 
equal-protection doctrine focused on whether vulnerable individuals had 
an immutable trait, like race or gender.114 Activists like Byrn implicitly 
conceded that the unborn children had no such trait. Indeed, pro-lifers 
presented abortion as discriminatory precisely because it deprived un-
born children of life, notwithstanding the fact that they resembled other 
rights-holders in every constitutionally salient way.115 Strategically, this 
move allowed antiabortion activists to respond to claims that fetuses did 
not count as legal persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.116 At the 
same time, by stressing the similarities between fetuses and other per-
sons, antiabortion activists like Byrn expressed deeply held beliefs that 
abortion would lead the nation down a slippery slope to euthanasia and 
discrimination against the disabled.117 
In 1973, the Roe Court rejected many of the premises of pro-life 
constitutionalism—including the personhood of the fetus and the conclu-
sion that life began at conception—while pushing others entirely below 
the surface.118 The district court in Roe had applied conventional strict 
scrutiny in analyzing an abortion regulation, asking whether such a ban 
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling justification.119 This framing 
set the terms of the Supreme Court’s own discussion. In resolving 
whether the State’s interest in protecting life was compelling, the Court 
highlighted disagreements between medical, philosophical, and religious 
authorities, concluding that “the unborn have never been recognized in 
the law as persons in the whole sense.”120 The Court touched only indi-
rectly on the question of a right to life, assuming that “[i]f . . . [fetal] per-
sonhood is established,” the case for abortion rights would collapse, “for 
the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Four-
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teenth] Amendment.”121 By dismissing the idea that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment defined fetuses as persons, the Court went no 
further in exploring whether the Constitution recognized a right to life.122 
 Movement leaders responded by working harder than ever to revo-
lutionize equal-protection jurisprudence, pushing powerlessness and 
helplessness as the center of constitutional analysis. Nellie Gray’s March 
for Life, an organization leading a major pro-life protest of the same 
name, issued materials explaining: “If our Constitution, as now interpret-
ed, cannot guarantee the right to be secure in one’s person in order to be 
born, it cannot long protect the right to be secure in one’s person during 
illness, physical and mental disability, [and] senility . . . .”123 
Partly for this reason, the fetal-protective amendment preferred by 
many pro-lifers advanced a right to equal treatment not only for the un-
born but also for any similarly vulnerable individuals.124 A variety of 
Article V amendments proposed in Congress would have changed the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly including the unborn 
as persons.125 However, leaders of groups like the NRLC and AUL in-
sisted that their movement demanded protection for all vulnerable and 
dependent persons. The NRLC endorsed an amendment that would re-
quire protection of life regardless of age, health, function or condition of 
dependency.126 Dr. John Willke of the NRLC insisted that “civil rights 
[under the Fourteenth Amendment] mean nothing if they do not protect 
the weakest and most helpless of the humans among us.”127 He asked: 
“[S]hould we allow the Supreme Court to define the right to life on the 
basis of age and place of residence?”128  
D. Pro-Life Activists Contest the Meaning of Dependency and Vulnera-
bility 
While antiabortion activists shared a vision of the Equal Protection 
Clause, movement members disagreed intensely about who counted as 
vulnerable and dependent persons. Some movement members focused 
exclusively on the abortion issue, while others also mobilized to battle 
living-will and death-with-dignity laws.129 Still others viewed pregnant 
women, and perhaps all women, as vulnerable, dependent, and deserving 
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of protection. These activists expressed themselves in the conventional 
rhetoric of the pro-life movement, demanding a reworking of equal-
protection doctrine. However, as this Part shows, these advocates moved 
toward a radical reconceptualization of the movement’s goals, one cen-
tered partly on women’s constitutional interests in liberty and equality. 
These activists turned to meaningful choice in advocating what they 
viewed as both protections against sex discrimination and alternatives to 
abortion. To be sure, antiabortion advocates disagreed with feminists 
about the meaning of reproductive liberty.130 They insisted that the State 
should ban all, or most, abortions—and could do so without denying 
women constitutional autonomy.131 At the same time, some influential 
pro-life activists maintained that women did not have the freedom to 
choose childbirth or procreation unless the State protected them against 
sex discrimination.132 
During the battle for an Article V amendment recognizing a right to 
life, members of ACCL , an influential antiabortion organization, began 
to develop an argument that combined antidiscrimination and reproduc-
tive-liberty reasoning. In testifying in favor of an Article V amendment 
banning abortion, Dorothy Czarnecki of the ACCL argued: 
It is my opinion that women are equal to but not the same as men. In 
the natural order of things, this will never change. Women deserve 
equal rights, equal pay, equal job opportunities, and equal[ity] under 
the law. Women ought to have the right over their own bodies, inso-
far as they can determine whether or not they shall become pregnant. 
They deserve to be educated. Equal opportunity means that, rich or 
poor, black or white, they shall [be able] . . . to receive sex education, 
and contraceptive information . . . . It does not mean that we shall 
supply abortion to those who cannot afford it.133 
Czarnecki endorsed an idea of choice that seemed incoherent to 
feminists who saw the connection between abortion rights, autonomy, 
and equality for women. At the same time, Czarnecki agreed with femi-
nists that formal equality was not enough to guarantee women meaning-
ful reproductive choice. “Equal opportunity” involved neither abortion 
nor identical treatment: women’s special vulnerability meant that they 
needed and deserved assistance in accessing sex education and contra-
ception.134 Czarnecki’s vision of equality for women would drive pro-life 
support for the PDA. Members of groups like the ACCL concluded that 
pregnancy made women biologically and culturally different, vulnerable 
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to pernicious forms of discrimination.135 Equal treatment for pregnant 
women would require some affirmative intervention on the part of the 
State—to end discrimination and to ensure pregnant women a minimum 
level of income, healthcare, and child care. 
In 1975, while still pushing an Article V amendment, Marjory 
Mecklenburg of the ACCL modified the reproductive-liberty reasoning 
used in the litigation of Geduldig.136 First, Mecklenburg testified that 
pregnant women represented a key example of the vulnerable persons 
currently denied the protection of the Constitution. Asking Congress to 
pay more attention to the women who wanted to continue a pregnancy, 
Mecklenburg asserted that such women constituted “a disadvantaged 
class.”137 Pregnant women were vulnerable partly because the govern-
ment denied them meaningful reproductive choice. “It is sad indeed,” she 
testified, “that women are making choices about whether to give their 
children the right to life or to terminate based on economic conditions. If 
they feel pressured because of the economic situation, we can ask what 
kind of a choice do they really have?”138 
By 1975, activists like Mecklenburg had elaborated on this idea of 
choice, translating it into a powerful vision for legislative change. Meck-
lenburg lobbied for a number of laws designed to help pregnant women 
and new mothers: amendments to the Social Security Act allowing preg-
nant women to claim unborn children as dependents; “federal and indi-
vidual state legislation . . . providing that pregnancy, parenthood, or mar-
ital status cannot constitute grounds for denial of education”; and social 
welfare programs designed to help indigent, adolescent mothers.139 In 
February 1975, Mecklenburg came out in favor of the School Age Moth-
ers and Children Act of 1975, an ultimately unsuccessful social welfare 
bill sponsored by abortion-rights champions Birch Bayh (D-IN) and Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA).140 The law would have guaranteed a variety of family 
planning, childcare, and healthcare services for adolescent mothers and 
their children.141 Guaranteeing adolescent mothers meaningful reproduc-
tive choice would, in Mecklenburg’s view, reduce abortion rates, since 
the mother of a fetus was the “first line of defense against pre-birth ag-
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gression.”142 But Mecklenburg went further, endorsing her own under-
standing of constitutional choice: 
[M]any poor women, pressed by financial circumstances, presently 
have only the “freedom” to abort . . . .  
. . . .  
Alternatives to abortion must be real if freedom of conscience and re-
sponsibility are to be more than rhetoric. This means that society 
must offer good health care, both pre and post-natal; daycare facili-
ties; . . . [and] maternity and paternity leave . . . .143 
The vision of meaningful choice written into laws like the School 
Age Mother and Child Act assumed that the State had to refrain from 
burdening women’s decisions. Mecklenburg explained: “Americans must 
examine the pregnant woman’s life situation, assess what is necessary to 
preserve her personal dignity and her mental and physical health, and 
then provide for these needs. . . . Women must not be forced by circum-
stances to seek an abortion . . . .”144 
Prior to 1976, members of the ACCL borrowed heavily from the 
special-burden reasoning rejected by the courts, giving it new life as a 
legislative constitutional norm. For legal feminists, special-burden rea-
soning served a different purpose: rebutting claims that women demand-
ed preferential treatment. As the battle against pregnancy discrimination 
moved to Congress, business leaders and industry groups insisted that 
pregnancy disability policies themselves represented discrimination 
against men.145 Given the right of reproductive choice, women bore chil-
dren and then unfairly demanded that someone else foot the bill. For 
legal feminists responding to these charges, it became crucial to show 
that women wanted equal, rather than special, opportunities. Reworking 
the reproductive-liberty reasoning used by some pro-lifers offered femi-
nists a valuable strategy for achieving this task. 
E. Feminists Shift from Juridical to Legislative Constitutionalism 
In the aftermath of their defeat in Geduldig, feminists turned to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a source of protection against 
pregnancy discrimination, this time, working with an unlikely set of al-
lies. As the New York Times reported in September 1975, “A cause that 
has managed to unite women from feminists to members of the Right to 
Life movement is the right to disability benefits for time lost due to 
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pregnancy.”146 Progress in the courts made Title VII litigation an attrac-
tive option: the Second and Third Circuit held that pregnancy discrimina-
tion violated Title VII notwithstanding the holding of Geduldig.147 Rely-
ing on LaFleur, the Supreme Court itself had struck down a Utah law 
disqualifying women from receiving unemployment insurance for an 
eighteen-week period preceding and following pregnancy because they 
were “unable to work.”148 As Kathy Willert Peratis of the ACLU ex-
plained: “We’re really making headway now.”149 
This progress came to an abrupt halt in 1976 when the Supreme 
Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. Rejecting the interpreta-
tion of Title VII adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission and many lower courts, the Gilbert Court decided that pregnancy 
discrimination did not count as sex discrimination.150 Gilbert reasoned 
that what women demanded was not protection against discrimination 
but rather special treatment, since “pregnancy-related disabilities consti-
tute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate 
them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, 
accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially even-
handed inclusion of risks.”151  
For legal feminists, Gilbert’s reasoning was deeply disappointing. 
Peratis put the point bluntly, telling the New York Times: “We bombed 
out in court, so we’ll have to go to Congress.”152 However, feminists did 
far more then switch from the juridical to the legislative arena. Instead, 
organizations like the ACLU and the Women’s Legal Defense Fund 
(WLDF) continued litigating, seeking to carve out a space for Title VII 
protections in the aftermath of Gilbert. In cases like Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty,153 feminists had to work within a Gilbert framework that denied 
women’s right to “special treatment” in the context of pregnancy.154 In 
turn, Satty and Gilbert helped to shape the arguments used by both busi-
ness lobbyists and legal feminists in the battle for the PDA. Business 
leaders popularized the idea of pregnancy disability as reverse discrimi-
nation against men.155 Since women had the freedom to terminate preg-
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nancies, as business leaders asserted, women should have to bear the 
costs of any children they bore.156 Forcing employers to do so would 
result in discrimination against both male employees and business own-
ers. Legal feminists responded by drawing on an idea of impermissible 
burdens similar to the one set forth in Satty.157 The reliance on the bene-
fit-burden distinction ultimately encouraged feminists working in Con-
gress to turn back to the reproductive-liberty reasoning rejected by the 
Court. 
F. Satty Plays Up the Benefit-Burden Distinction 
Nora Satty worked as a clerk in the accounting department of the 
Nashville Gas Company when she became pregnant.158 The company 
required Satty to take maternity leave and refused to give her sick pay 
during her absence.159 Worse, while she was on leave, the company took 
away the seniority Satty had already earned.160 When she reapplied for 
work, the company placed her in a temporary position and, pursuant to 
its policy, denied her every permanent position she applied for because 
other, more senior employees had bid for them.161 After Satty completed 
her temporary assignment, the company terminated her “due to lack of 
work and job openings.”162 
When Satty’s case came before the Supreme Court, both her coun-
sel and amici curiae, including the ACLU and the Women’s Legal De-
fense Fund, focused on how Satty’s case differed from Gilbert. While 
that case denied “special benefits,” Nora Satty’s defenders insisted that 
they wanted nothing more than equal treatment.163 In a brief signed by 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Susan Deller Ross, the ACLU and WLDF ar-
gued that “no ‘extra compensation’ issue [was] present” in Satty.164 In-
stead of directly challenging the validity of Gilbert or Geduldig, the brief 
shifted the focus to the special burdens imposed on the liberty of Satty 
and other pregnant women. As the brief explained:  
Although Title VII does not require that greater economic benefits be 
paid to one sex or the other “because of their different roles in the 
scheme of existence”, [sic] by the same token Title VII hardly per-
mits an employer specifically to burden female employees through-
out their working lives because of their different role.165 
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The brief insisted that Satty and other pregnant women did not re-
quest accommodation of their pregnancies.166 Rather, Satty asked the 
Court to stop the employer from burdening their ability to work because 
they had chosen to have children.167 
In a terse opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, Satty held 
that some, but not all, pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII.168 
Holding that the Nashville Gas Company’s policies violated Title VII, 
Rehnquist distinguished pregnancy disability policies, which afforded 
pregnant women “a benefit that men cannot and do not receive,” from 
the burdens imposed in Satty.169 “We held in Gilbert that [Title VII] did 
not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other 
‘because of their differing roles in “the scheme of human existence,”’” 
Rehnquist explained.170 “But that holding does not allow us to read [the 
statute] to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way 
as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their differ-
ent role.”171 
Publicly, legal feminists interpreted Satty as a signal that legislative, 
rather than juridical, constitutionalism represented the most promising 
path for women seeking equal treatment or reproductive liberty.172 Since 
Satty did not provide clear guidance about when pregnancy disability 
policies would run afoul of Title VII, Susan Deller Ross of the ACLU 
called the decision “confused,” reasoning that it “showed the importance 
of a new Federal law to make all discrimination against pregnant workers 
illegal.”173  
Rather than simply reinforcing the importance of amending Title 
VII, Satty encouraged feminists to change the temporary-disability para-
digm used for much of the early 1970s.174 Defining pregnancy as a mere 
temporary disability had worked to dispel the myth that women who bore 
children necessarily left work to raise them.175 At the same time, 
“[c]lassifying pregnancy within the temporary disability framework 
. . . represented an effort to extend socioeconomic protection to 
childbearing workers without discouraging women’s employment.”176 
After Gilbert, skeptical members of Congress and business leaders de-
nounced any effort to provide socioeconomic protection for women, pre-
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senting it as the kind of unfair special accommodation that Gilbert re-
jected.177 During and after Satty, legal feminists responded by reframing 
the PDA not only as “an effort to extend socioeconomic protection”178 
but also as a guarantee that employers could not impose unique burdens 
on either women’s decision to work or procreate. 
G. Business Groups, Pro-Lifers, and Feminists Contest the Benefit-
Burden Distinction 
The benefit-burden distinction central to Satty also shaped debate 
about the PDA in 1977. Testifying on behalf of the Chamber of Com-
merce, Brockwell Heylin insisted that the issue was whether Congress 
was willing to provide special benefits to pregnant women that other 
workers could never enjoy.179 Testimony highlighted statistics suggesting 
that only 40%–50% of pregnant workers returned to work after maternity 
leave,180 while “almost 100% of other workers taking disability leave do 
return to work.”181 Insofar as pregnancy was sui generis, the PDA would 
not provide protection against discrimination; it would in fact discrimi-
nate against other employees. Heylin reasoned: “The pregnancy disabil-
ity benefits would become a severance pay which other (non-pregnant) 
employees cannot receive.”182 
Testimony on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) made more explicit the connection between framing pregnancy 
as a choice and denouncing the PDA as a form of special treatment.183 
NAM representatives emphasized that men and women chose when they 
married, chose when they had sexual intercourse, chose when they used 
contraception, and chose when they turned to abortion.184 “Within this 
climate, it is appropriate to ask how much of the economic responsibility 
for parenthood will be assumed by those men and women who choose to 
have children” the NAM asked, “and how much responsibility will be 
[placed on] society . . . .”185 The central issue was not whether Congress 
should countenance discrimination but rather “how far society chooses to 
go in subsidizing parenthood.”186 
As both pro-lifers and legal feminists recognized, the PDA would 
create some socioeconomic security for pregnant women. Importing spe-
cial-burden reasoning into the PDA allowed both groups to avoid the 
charge that they demanded special treatment for women. Instead, sup-
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porters of the PDA contended that the law protected women from unfair 
and potentially unconstitutional burdens on their reproductive decision- 
making that men never faced.  
Moreover, meaningful-choice reasoning allowed pro-life activists to 
present their movement as reasonable, moderate, and willing to advance 
real reproductive choice—a major goal of ACCL leaders.187 Lobbying 
for meaningful choice showed that some pro-lifers could work in broad 
legislative coalitions, advancing interests (beyond abortion bans) that 
other Americans held dear.188  
More broadly, pro-lifers seized on pregnancy discrimination as an 
issue, hoping to “promote[] motherhood.”189 Some movement members 
believed that poor women terminated their pregnancies in order to pre-
serve their livelihood.190 Protecting women against pregnancy discrimi-
nation would ensure that more women could afford to bring their preg-
nancies to term. Pro-life activist and obstetrician-gynecologist Andre 
Hellegers told Congress that the PDA would deter coercive abortions.191 
“Let’s call it a pro-choice bill,” Hellegers quipped, “in which . . . the 
choice, if it goes in any direction, is going to go in the childbirth way.”192  
Other pro-life witnesses developed a more comprehensive vision of 
meaningful-choice reasoning. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley of the ACCL at-
tacked Gilbert as a “dangerous precedent with respect to the exercise of 
fundamental rights.”193 Nolan-Haley identified four rights at stake in 
pregnancy discrimination: “The decision to procreate, the decision not to 
terminate a pregnancy, the decision to prevent [pregnancy] through con-
traception, and the decision to terminate a pregnancy.”194 According to 
Nolan-Haley, Gilbert unjustly—and perhaps unconstitutionally—
“penalized women who chose to exercise the first two rights to the exclu-
sion of the latter.”195 
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Legal feminists like Wendy Williams and Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, a 
feminist author, relied on meaningful-choice reasoning for a quite differ-
ent reason: countering claims that the PDA required expensive and unfair 
special treatment. In testifying in favor of the PDA, Williams spotlighted 
what she called “[a] necessary side effect” of pregnancy discrimination: 
“the burden placed upon a woman’s choice to bear a child.”196 She rea-
soned that Congress did not (and should not) intend that any citizen “for-
go a fundamental right, such as a woman’s right to bear children, as a 
condition precedent to the enjoyment of . . . employment free from dis-
crimination.”197  
Cottin-Pogrebin articulated the connection between pregnancy dis-
crimination and reproductive choice more forcefully, explaining that 
women asked for nothing more than protection against burdens society 
never imposed on men:  
Pregnancy discrimination forces us to choose between brain and 
uterus; between making money and making babies; between being 
productive or being reproductive. It is a false dilemma. Men do not 
have to make this choice; they can be both parents and workers with-
out suffering a social, personal, or economic penalty.198  
In spite of deep differences about the nature of motherhood and the 
need for legal abortion, the PDA campaign led pro-lifers and legal femi-
nists to adopt a strikingly similar and transformative understanding of 
reproductive choice. As Deborah Dinner has shown, legal feminists be-
gan highlighting the uniqueness of motherhood in justifying protection 
from the government.199 Pro-lifers like Mecklenburg had long empha-
sized the uniqueness of motherhood in asserting that abortion severed a 
particularly valuable bond between mother and child, thereby traumatiz-
ing any woman who terminated a pregnancy.200  
Conversely, pro-life activists like Mecklenburg and Czarnecki grav-
itated toward a definition of meaningful reproductive choice that would 
prevent discrimination against women who took leave after an abortion 
as well as a pregnancy. The ACCL’s change in position was striking. 
After all, leaders of the group had endorsed an Article V amendment 
banning abortion, asserting that the Constitution did not recognize rights 
for women “to choose to destroy their unborn children.”201 In the PDA 
campaign, ACCL leaders argued that they would support the PDA re-
gardless of whether employers had to cover post-abortion leave, because 
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the law “would encourage a woman to keep a pregnancy or do what she 
wants. It gives women a choice.”202 If anything, the ACCL favored a 
version of the PDA that did not exclude post-abortion treatment, since 
some within the organization believed that the law would garner more 
support if no abortion exclusion applied.203 As an ACCL leader ex-
plained: “ACCL supports H.R. 6075 [the PDA] as a pro-life bill with or 
without an abortion amendment and urges its prompt passage.”204 
This understanding of meaningful reproductive choice made an im-
pact on the larger society. A variety of religious organizations, including 
the progressive National Council of Churches, endorsed a more robust 
concept of a right to choose—one that required affirmative support for 
women seeking to procreate or avoid procreation.205  
More importantly, this understanding of meaningful choice influ-
enced many of the key supporters of the PDA. Key sponsors of the PDA 
across the ideological spectrum echoed this idea of reproductive choice. 
Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) argued that sex discrimination could 
effectively coerce women into terminating a pregnancy:  
[T]here are a number of reasons why a woman would want to have 
an abortion. One of the reasons is that she cannot afford the expenses 
attendant to a prolonged pregnancy and childbirth. . . . We are remov-
ing that [situation] where the price tag of a baby determines whether 
it is born or not.206 
Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-CT) similarly argued that women 
with real reproductive choice would be better able to participate in the 
economic and social life of the nation.207 The PDA gave a woman “the 
right to choose both, to be financially and legally protected before, dur-
ing, and after her pregnancy.”208 According to a Democratic supporter of 
the bill, the PDA would “put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system 
that forces women to choose between family and career.”209 
Those on opposing sides of the abortion issue understood meaning-
ful reproductive choice in varying ways and described it differently over 
time. In the early-to-mid-1970s, feminist litigators first used the idea to 
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demand both abortion rights and freedom from sex discrimination. These 
attorneys framed meaningful choice as a justification for heightened ju-
dicial scrutiny. Feminist litigators also used meaningful choice to expose 
understudied connections between equality and liberty for women. 
Forced to negotiate in the legislative arena, in the mid-1970s, femi-
nists redefined meaningful choice, playing up connections between pov-
erty, sex equality, and the costs of reproduction. In responding to busi-
ness lobbyists, feminists also emphasized the language of benefits and 
burdens to counter accusations that pregnant women were seeking spe-
cial treatment. 
In the mid-1970s, feminists’ troubled partnership with pro-lifers al-
so transformed arguments about meaningful choice. Pro-life advocates 
understood meaningful choice in different terms than did feminists, ob-
scuring any connection between abortion, equality, and liberty. Whereas 
many feminists saw protective legislation as a reflection of damaging sex 
stereotypes, these antiabortion activists also viewed women as vulnerable 
and deserving of protection. Over time, however, some pro-lifers devel-
oped a fuller account of why women were vulnerable—one that focused 
heavily on sex stereotyping and discrimination. By the later 1970s, some 
pro-lifers found more common ground with feminists, favoring the PDA 
even if it did not prohibit abortion coverage. 
The idea of meaningful reproductive choice underlying the PDA 
had radical implications. Women in favor of and opposed to abortion 
brought to the surface often-ignored connections between liberty and 
equality, presenting protection from sex discrimination as a necessary 
precondition for any true exercise of reproductive liberty. Both feminists 
and pro-lifers defined choice as much more than freedom from state in-
terference. Indeed, calling for meaningful reproductive choice allowed 
activists on either side of the abortion question to navigate difficult ques-
tions about “special treatment” and “reverse discrimination” plaguing the 
civil rights movement and the women’s movement in the late 1970s.210 
By presenting private acts of discrimination—and even poverty—as im-
permissible burdens on a woman’s reproductive liberty, opposing activ-
ists found a powerful new way of demanding economic security for 
working women.  
Superficially, this understanding of meaningful choice seems con-
sistent with the position taken by most federal courts that employers can 
satisfy the PDA by creating pregnancy-blind disability policies.211 Legal 
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feminists, pro-life activists, and legislators sympathetic to either group 
generally rejected the idea that the PDA created special benefits for 
pregnant women. However, the history of arguments for meaningful re-
productive choice revealed a more complex legislative purpose underly-
ing the PDA. Meaningful-choice arguments forced Congress to evaluate 
pregnant women based on their ability to work rather than the “cause” of 
their disability. By penalizing pregnant women for the cause of their dis-
ability, employers would impose burdens on women’s reproductive deci-
sion-making that other workers completely avoided. Pregnancy-blind 
policies impose precisely the kind of harsh burden the framers of the 
PDA—and activists on both sides of the abortion question—sought to 
prevent. 
Why did meaningful reproductive choice arguments fade from view 
in the aftermath of the PDA battle? Part II argues that these contentions 
lost influence not because of any inherent flaw but because of changes to 
the larger political landscape.  
II. THE DECLINE OF MEANINGFUL REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 
Since the 1980s, both antiabortion leaders and feminist commenta-
tors have pointed out fundamental flaws in the use of choice as a frame-
work for reproductive liberty. Before and after her nomination to the 
Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the privacy rationale for 
abortion rights as unconvincing, reasoning that the Court might have 
rendered the abortion conflict less intense had it grounded abortion rights 
in the Equal Protection Clause.212 Commentators have pointed out that a 
privacy rationale laid the foundation for later Supreme Court decisions 
upholding bans on abortion funding.213 Historian Rickie Solinger has 
argued that a choice framework ratified existing race and class divisions 
governing access to reproductive healthcare.214  
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This Part contends that choice arguments lost influence in the abor-
tion debate not because of any of the flaws identified by feminist com-
mentators but rather because of a rapidly changing political reality. First, 
pro-life arguments for meaningful choice came into growing tension with 
the campaign to preserve bans on abortion funding. In the context of 
funding bans, antiabortion activists, including those like Mecklenburg, 
came to argue that rights to choose guaranteed only freedom from state 
interference. Increasingly, the abortion funding issue divided the coali-
tion that had successfully pushed the PDA. 
Moreover, as the Part shows next, coalition politics undermined 
meaningful-choice reasoning. With the emergence of the New Right and 
Religious Right, antiabortion activists allied with partners who rejected 
both a strong antidiscrimination policy and a broadening of the social 
welfare net. The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and a slate of pro-life 
Republicans reinforced antiabortion activists’ dependence on allies op-
posed to the central premises of meaningful-choice reasoning.  
Finally, as the Part shows, facing setbacks in the Supreme Court, 
Congress, the academy, and state legislatures, feminists began searching 
for a more constitutionally sound and popularly resonant justification for 
abortion rights. As progressives developed what many saw as sounder 
defenses of abortion rights, academics and grassroots activists lost sight 
of the transformative understandings of choice used in the PDA cam-
paign. 
A. The Abortion Funding Battle Divides Supporters of Meaningful Re-
productive Choice 
In the mid-1970s, as the battle for bans on publicly funded abortion 
picked up pace, pro-life legislators and grassroots activists deployed two 
key arguments involving a right to choose. First, some activists and poli-
ticians charged that taxpayers had a right to conscientiously object to the 
funding of what they saw as the “murder [of] the unborn.”215 To some 
extent, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), the sponsor of an ultimately 
successful funding ban, described both poverty and abortion as acute 
social injustices: 
“Let the poor women of America make a list of those things that so-
ciety denies them and which are enjoyed by rich women” . . . “De-
cent housing, decent education, . . . decent income, and then say to 
them, ‘Now [sic] those will take second place. But we will encourage 
you to kill your . . . children.”216 
Hyde also insisted that poor women had no right to government as-
sistance of any kind. While admitting that he would ban all abortions if 
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he could, Hyde emphasized that the right to choose recognized in Roe in 
no way required the State to pay for abortion.217 In the Supreme Court, 
attorneys representing Americans United for Life Legal Defense and 
Education Fund similarly explained: “If the abortion decision is so pri-
vate . . . it follows that government should not itself be compelled to re-
spond to the demand of the exercise of that private right . . . .”218 Under 
Roe, the state could not interfere with a woman’s decision-making but 
had no obligation to fund abortion.219  
By 1978, the year Congress passed the PDA, the war over funding 
bans had intensified. Congress passed the Hyde Amendment in 1976, and 
in 1977, the Supreme Court upheld several similar state laws.220 Almost 
as soon as it passed, the Hyde Amendment sparked intense conflict about 
exceptions for rape, incest, and health.221 Locked in a constant struggle to 
preserve funding bans, pro-lifers like Marjory Mecklenburg retreated 
from their earlier positions on meaningful choice.222 In pushing the PDA, 
Mecklenburg and the ACCL had defended an idea of choice that required 
protection against sex discrimination, going so far as to support a bill that 
required employers to give women post-abortion leave.223 By 1978, 
Mecklenburg again joined Planned Parenthood in lobbying for an ulti-
mately successful bill, the Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy 
Care Act of 1978, requiring state support for both family planning and 
for adolescents seeking to bear and raise children.224 This time, however, 
Mecklenburg argued that women’s right to meaningful choice did not 
extend to abortion access. “‘Freedom to choose’ implies that it is equally 
possible for a woman to choose to give birth as well as to abort,” Meck-
lenburg argued.225 “Today frightened, confused and dependent adoles-
cents often have little freedom to continue a pregnancy unless the kind of 
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services this bill details are readily available.”226 When addressing the 
scope of reproductive freedom, however, Mecklenburg concluded that 
meaningful choice should not include abortion.227 Reversing an earlier 
position, she maintained that the public would not support a meaningful-
choice law if it included abortion services. “If abortion is interjected in 
this bill,” argued Mecklenburg, “I believe it will reduce or eliminate its 
chances of passage . . . .”228 
B. Political Party Realignment Undercuts Support for Meaningful 
Choice 
Before the late 1970s, both the antiabortion and abortion-rights 
movements appealed to politicians and activists across the ideological 
spectrum. By the late 1970s, pro-life positions had become a calling card 
of grassroots conservatism.229 The mobilization of organizations identify-
ing with the New Right and Religious Right, members of which opposed 
abortion, represented a potent new source of allies and political influence 
for pro-life leaders.230 Organizations like the Moral Majority and Chris-
tian Voice provided much-needed financial support and political connec-
tions for a struggling pro-life movement.231 Political operatives frustrated 
with the mainstream Republican Party, including Paul Weyrich and 
Richard Viguerie, united fragmented single-issue groups, forging a pow-
erful social-conservative coalition.232 By backing Ronald Reagan and 
other Republican candidates who endorsed antiabortion positions, pro-
lifers bid for unprecedented political influence.233 Even though many 
antiabortion voters had long supported the Democratic Party and contin-
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ued to do so well into the 1980s, pro-lifers had more reason than ever to 
forge a partnership with the Religious Right and the Republican Party.234  
Meaningful-choice arguments no longer fit in the new agenda craft-
ed by the antiabortion movement and its allies. Reagan’s presidential 
campaign had popularized neoliberalism, a theory highlighting the merits 
of deregulation, welfare cuts, and free markets.235 “Reaganomics” trans-
lated these ideas into an overarching economic philosophy.236 When it 
came to welfare, Reagan worked with the New Right to reframe depend-
ency as a vice rather than a source of vulnerability.237 New Right politics 
promised to shrink the social safety net activists like Mecklenburg had 
promoted as a precondition for true reproductive choice.  
Whereas pro-lifers had long demanded equal treatment for all de-
pendent Americans, Reagan described dependency as dangerous. In a 
1981 speech, Reagan related the story of a victim of the welfare state—a 
young woman who “had become so dependent on the welfare check that 
she even turned down offers of marriage.”238 Reagan’s story echoed 
statements made by the New Right connecting the welfare state and the 
decline of the traditional family. A healthy dose of economic self-
sufficiency, Reagan suggested, would save the family and revive an ail-
ing economy.239 More importantly, “ideas previously seen as distinctly 
conservative had become mainstream.”240 Abortion opponents joined a 
political coalition committed to dismantling the welfare state. American 
voters appeared increasingly hostile to the idea that welfare counted as a 
right for children or anyone else. In this environment, meaningful-choice 
arguments lost momentum. 
Reagan’s Justice Department also scaled back on antidiscrimination 
protections, particularly when those policies required affirmative ac-
tion.241 While continuing to enforce an existing affirmative-action execu-
tive order, Reagan Administration officials filed suit seeking to overturn 
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quotas in some fifty affirmative-action decrees.242 Ideologically, admin-
istration officials developed a stinging criticism of “special treatment.”243 
In 1987, in California Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra,244 the 
Reagan Administration crystallized its position. Guerra asked whether 
Title VII preempted any state law requiring employers to provide certain 
benefits to pregnant workers.245 In arguing against the California policy, 
the Reagan Administration described laws mandating accommodations 
for pregnancy as the kind of “reverse discrimination” that Title VII pro-
hibited and that the administration opposed.246 The pro-life movement’s 
allies in the New Right and Religious Right strongly opposed affirmative 
action.247  
Arguments for meaningful choice no longer made sense to a pro-life 
movement working so closely with opponents of gender-based affirma-
tive action. When antiabortion activists like Marjory Mecklenburg de-
fended reproductive choice, they demanded protection for pregnant 
women and mothers—those they saw as members of a particularly vul-
nerable and dependent class.248 New Right activists responded that since 
women already enjoyed special privileges, antidiscrimination protections 
represented a step down, a threat to “conventional culture, established 
institutions, and customary social roles.”249 When the antiabortion 
movement partnered with the political right, prior commitments to the 
expansion of antidiscrimination law seemed profoundly out of step. 
C. Feminists Seek Better Justifications for Abortion Rights 
As pro-lifers moved away from support for meaningful reproductive 
choice, attacks on legal abortion encouraged feminists to develop new 
arguments for abortion rights, including claims relying on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Starting in 1973, legal 
academics from across the ideological spectrum attacked the constitu-
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tional underpinnings of the Roe decision.250 Starting with John Hart Ely’s 
The Wages of Crying Wolf, legal academics presented the substantive 
due process reasoning of Roe as unconvincing, intellectually under-
whelming, and even results-oriented.251 By the early 1980s, academic 
attacks on Roe prompted a powerful response from legal feminists com-
mitted to abortion rights. Commentators from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to 
Catherine MacKinnon argued that the problem with Roe lay not in its 
recognition of abortion rights but rather in the rationale offered for those 
rights.252 As legal feminists worked to develop a better explanation for 
abortion rights, the transformative uses of choice that appeared in the 
1970s faded from view.253  
At least in the 1970s, however, the framers of the PDA (and a varie-
ty of laws guaranteeing protections for low-income mothers) advanced 
an idea of reproductive choice dramatically at odds with the narrow un-
derstanding now linked to the Roe decision. The framers of the PDA 
emphasized this idea of meaningful choice, presenting antidiscrimination 
law as a crucial protection against reproductive coercion.  
Placing the PDA in a broader historical context spotlights the short-
comings of current judicial interpretations of the law. Courts have gener-
ally interpreted the PDA to include three interrelated rights: the right to 
an individualized judgment of capacity, the right to work if not incapaci-
tated, and the right to whatever accommodations an employer offers 
workers who have the same physical capacity to work.254 By contrast, 
women have fared poorly when seeking light-duty work or some other 
modification that would allow them to work throughout pregnancy.255 As 
Joanna Grossman has argued, “The failure of current law to acknowledge 
a pregnant woman’s right to work despite temporary, partial impairments 
or risks systematically undermines the ability of women to attain work-
place equality.”256 As the history of struggles for meaningful choice 
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makes apparent, that same failure undermines the idea of reproductive 
liberty written into the PDA.  
Part III examines how—and how much—Young transformed preg-
nancy-discrimination jurisprudence. While the Court removed some of 
the barriers in the way of individual disparate treatment claims, employ-
ers can still impose the kind of burdens on reproductive decision-making 
that the PDA was designed to rule out. 
III. YOUNG, ACCOMMODATION, AND MEANINGFUL REPRODUCTIVE 
CHOICE 
The theory of meaningful choice developed by abortion opponents 
and legal feminists stands in obvious tension with decisions interpreting 
the PDA to require only what the courts call “pregnancy blindness.” 
Where does the Supreme Court’s decision in Young leave pregnancy-
blind policies and meaningful choice more broadly? After briefly laying 
out the theory of meaningful reproductive choice underlying the PDA, 
this Part begins by examining pre-Young analysis of light-work and other 
accommodation requests. Next, the Part explores what Young did and did 
not change about the judicial treatment of pregnancy-blind policies. Fi-
nally, in the aftermath of Young, the Part considers the best strategy for 
advancing the norm of meaningful choice that feminists and antiabortion 
activists embraced.  
A. The Legislative Constitutional Norm of Meaningful Choice  
The story of the PDA underlying the Young litigation spotlights the 
importance of what Reva Siegel and Robert Post have called legislative 
constitutionalism,257 a process that “delivered what even a more generous 
American [juridical] Constitutionalism could not: affirmative rights ap-
plicable to private as well as public workplaces.”258 Often, scholars de-
scribe the rights created by the PDA as formal-equality protections, that 
is, guarantees that pregnant women enjoy protection from stereotyping 
and rights to access the benefits employers provide to similarly disabled 
employees.259 Understanding the role of meaningful-choice reasoning 
reveals a more radical purpose advanced by the framers of the PDA and 
their supporters.  
It is worth explaining why an idea of choice thoroughly rejected by 
the Court gained currency in Congress. While some constitutional rights 
require particular remedies or entailments, others “function as values that 
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courts seek to realize, rather than as principles that mandate specific re-
medial entailments.”260 Siegel and Post offer the example of judicially 
ordered school desegregation orders.261 Although these orders may not be 
specifically required by the Equal Protection Clause, they count as a cru-
cial attempt to give it meaning.262 The guarantee of meaningful choice 
recognized in the PDA operates in a similar way. While the Court has 
made clear that the Constitution protects a woman’s freedom to make 
certain reproductive decisions, the Court has found that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires no specific remedial steps to vindicate that right.263 
Through the PDA, Congress attempted to work out the meaning of con-
stitutional reproductive choice from the “distinct standpoint of [the] leg-
islature.”264 The story of the PDA makes clear important differences be-
tween legislative constitutionalism and the work of the courts and be-
tween the reproductive-liberty principles each embraced.   
Legislative constitutionalism differs from judicial decision-making 
in ways that mattered to the recognition of meaningful reproductive 
choice. Because of the case-or-controversy requirement, judicial deci-
sions address only those constitutional questions at stake in the litiga-
tion.265 By contrast, Congress can take on larger issues, writing into stat-
utes a more robust vision of what constitutional rights could mean.266 In 
particular, Congress can test the distinction between positive and nega-
tive rights, creating redistributive remedies.267 Congress effectively ex-
periments with such capacious notions of rights and remedies partly be-
cause it can act more cautiously in articulating its constitutional com-
mitments. Legislative constitutionalism can unfold incrementally, setting 
forth a principle and developing a remedial scheme over time.268 Crucial-
ly, Congress is also democratically accountable, and voters can respond 
to any perceived misstep in the articulation of important constitutional 
commitments.269 
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Key features of legislative constitutionalism made it much more ef-
fective for those arguing for meaningful reproductive choice. Courts may 
have neither the competence nor the will to fashion redistributive reme-
dies of the kind demanded by some proponents of reproductive choice.270 
Judicial precedents establishing a strong tradition of negative constitu-
tionalism do not bind Congress as they do the Court.271 A Congress ac-
countable to the people felt freer to experiment with different ideas of 
reproductive choice.  
The PDA modified the reasoning underlying meaningful-choice ar-
guments. As its legislative history makes plain, framers of the PDA set 
out not only to guarantee women individualized treatment but also to 
“put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to 
choose between family and career.”272 The framers of the PDA described 
as coercive disability policies that penalized women for taking pregnan-
cy-related leave.273 As the PDA’s sponsors framed it, these penalties bur-
dened an unquestionably constitutional right—a right for women “to 
continu[e] their pregnancy and maintain[] their jobs at the same time.”274 
While the courts may not view such policies as unconstitutional, Con-
gress concluded that pregnancy discrimination created an impermissible 
burden on women’s reproductive choice.275 
Just the same, in passing the PDA, Congress proceeded incremen-
tally, forging a compromise between feminists, pro-lifers, and business 
lobbyists. Under the PDA, if the employer chooses to accommodate any 
employee, that accommodation must be “administered equally for all 
workers in terms of their actual ability to perform work.”276 While em-
ployers had no affirmative duty to support a woman’s reproductive deci-
sion-making, they could not impose special burdens. As the House Re-
port for the PDA explained, the law required that “pregnant women be 
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inabil-
ity to work.”277  
Although incomplete, the PDA’s original guarantee of meaningful 
choice stands in obvious tension with current judicial interpretations of 
the law. The federal courts interpret the PDA to require “pregnancy-
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blind[ness].”278 That is, a policy passes muster as long as it “does not 
grant or deny light work on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.”279 Viewed in pure formal-equality terms, pregnan-
cy-blind policies seem valid, since such policies do not appear to single 
out pregnancy, at least superficially. Understood in the context of the 
liberty norms at work in the PDA, however, pregnancy-blind policies 
create just the kind of special burden on women’s reproductive decision- 
making that the PDA attempts to rule out.  
The Fifth Circuit first clearly articulated the pregnancy-blindness 
defense in 1998, in Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc.280 Mirtha Ur-
bano, a Continental employee, mostly worked as a ticket agent.281 While 
she performed a number of tasks, Urbano sometimes had to perform 
physical tasks, such as lifting customers’ luggage.282 After learning she 
was pregnant, Urbano began experiencing lower back pain and visited 
her physician.283 Because she had not been injured on the job, Continen-
tal found Urbano ineligible for a light-work assignment, forcing her to 
exhaust her family leave and go without pay.284 Urbano brought suit un-
der Title VII.285  
Several years earlier, the Sixth Circuit found that a similar light-
duty policy violated the PDA, since the law expressly required “that em-
ployers provide the same treatment of such individuals as provided for 
‘other persons . . . similar in their ability or inability to work.’”286 The 
Urbano Court disagreed.287 The formal terms of the employer’s policy, 
not its substantive effect, dictated the court’s analysis.288 Unless Urbano 
could show that Continental’s policy was a “pretext for discrimination 
against pregnant women or that it had a disparate impact on them,” the 
policy satisfied Title VII.289 The Fifth Circuit suggested that Title VII 
might mandate pregnancy blindness since a contrary “policy would treat 
a male employee ‘in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be 
different.’”290 
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The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young elaborated on the justifica-
tion for pregnancy blindness under the PDA. Peggy Young began work-
ing for UPS in 1999, and by 2002, she had secured a position driving a 
delivery truck.291 By 2006, Young had shifted to a part-time position as 
an air driver, working in the early morning and picking up packages de-
livered by air carrier the night before.292 In July 2006, after two rounds of 
unsuccessful in vitro fertilization, Young received leave from her em-
ployer to try a third time.293 When she finally became pregnant, several 
doctors told her not to lift more than twenty pounds for the first twenty 
weeks of her pregnancy.294 Armed with her doctors’ advice, Young re-
quested a light-work accommodation.295  
As a matter of official policy, UPS’s applicable Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement allowed accommodation only when workers were injured 
on the job or when employees had a disability cognizable under the 
ADA.296 UPS’s occupational health specialist, Cynthia Martin, concluded 
that Young’s pregnancy did not warrant ADA protection and had not 
occurred on the job, and as a result, Martin denied Young’s request.297 In 
November, when refused again by UPS’s Capitol Division Manager, 
Young had to exhaust her leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.298 
Between November 2006 and 2007, Young received no pay and eventu-
ally lost her medical coverage. 299 After April 2007, when she gave birth, 
she returned to work, filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).300 Young alleged race 
and sex discrimination under Title VII, as well as disability discrimina-
tion under the ADA.301 
In rejecting Young’s claim, the Fourth Circuit zeroed in on the se-
cond clause of the PDA, which provides, “women affected by pregnancy 
. . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work.”302 While acknowledging that the second clause of the PDA 
seemed clear on its face, the Fourth Circuit tried to reconcile it with the 
first clause.303 “Although the second clause can be read broadly,” the 
court explained, “we conclude that its placement in the definitional sec-
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tion of Title VII, and grounding within the confines of sex discrimination 
under § 703, make clear that it does not create a distinct and independent 
cause of action.”304 To do otherwise, as the court reasoned, would make 
pregnant workers a favored class, receiving special treatment other em-
ployees did not receive.305  
The same reasoning informed the court’s analysis of Young’s 
McDonnell-Douglas claim. “Under this framework, Young must estab-
lish a prima facie case of sex discrimination on her pregnancy claim by 
showing ‘(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job per-
formance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) that similarly-
situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable 
treatment.’”306  
The court focused on the fourth element—particularly, who counted 
as an appropriate comparator.307 Young urged the court to compare her to 
other workers similarly able to perform certain on-the-job tasks.308 By 
contrast, UPS primarily analyzed the source of different workers’ disabil-
ity.309 As the court explained, “Young is not similar to employees injured 
on the job because, quite simply, her inability to work does not arise 
from an on-the-job injury.”310 Finding that Young had not presented 
enough evidence of circumstances “giving rise to an inference of unlaw-
ful discrimination,” the court rejected her PDA claim.311  
B. Pregnancy Blindness After Young 
In vacating the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young, the Supreme 
Court tried to carve out a middle-ground position that differed from the 
stands taken by both UPS and the Fourth Circuit on the one hand and 
Peggy Young on the other.312 The dispute turned on the meaning of the 
second clause of the PDA, which states that pregnant workers shall be 
treated the same “as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work.”313 Young argued that “[t]he PDA . . . seeks 
to ensure that ‘women as capable of doing their jobs as their male coun-
terparts may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a 
job.’”314 In Young’s reading, the second clause did not require courts to 
set aside a conventional disparate-treatment analysis but did mandate that 
judges identifying a discriminatory intent compare pregnant workers to 
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others with a similar capacity to do a job, regardless of the source of their 
disability.315 Amici representing a variety of women’s rights and civil 
rights groups went further, arguing that “[t]he text of the Second Clause 
leaves no room for a distinction based on the source of the condition to 
masquerade as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.”316 By contrast, 
UPS argued that the second clause simply reaffirmed that pregnant 
workers counted among the protected classes covered by Title VII and 
said nothing about whether employers could accommodate some workers 
while leaving pregnant employees out.317 In individual disparate-
treatment analysis, courts were free to compare pregnant workers to oth-
ers on the basis of disability.318 If UPS excluded all employees not in-
jured on the job, the company would necessarily comply with the 
PDA.319 
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Breyer found none of these inter-
pretations persuasive. Like the lower courts, the majority found that 
Young’s interpretation would “grant[] pregnant workers a ‘most-favored-
nation’ status.”320 With little analysis of the purpose or history of the 
PDA, the Court dismissed the idea that Congress would have intended to 
mandate equal treatment of pregnant workers “irrespective of the nature 
of their jobs, the employer’s need to keep them working, their ages, or 
any other criteria.”321 In reaching this result, the majority relied on lan-
guage in the House and Senate Reports, which stated in pertinent part 
that the PDA “reestablish[ed] the law as it was understood prior to” the 
Gilbert decision in 1976.322 Since the Court applied the McDonnell-
Douglas framework prior to Gilbert, the majority concluded that em-
ployers could deny pregnant workers accommodations as long as they 
had “a legitimate, non-discriminatory, nonpretextual reason for doing 
so.”323  
Nor did the majority find that the text of the PDA required a differ-
ent interpretation. The second clause compared pregnant workers to 
“other persons” similarly unable to work.324 Because the clause did “not 
say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the ‘same’ as 
‘any other persons’ (who are similar in their ability or inability to work), 
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[or] . . . specify which other persons Congress had in mind,” the majority 
found Young’s reading unpersuasive.325 
However, the majority found UPS’s interpretation of the second 
clause equally unconvincing. As Justice Breyer explained, Congress in-
tended to overrule both the holding and reasoning of Gilbert.326 UPS’s 
reading would do nothing to a core premise of the Gilbert decision—
“that an employer can treat pregnancy less favorably than diseases or 
disabilities resulting in a similar inability to work.”327  
The Young majority further outlined what a worker could do to suc-
ceed in an individual disparate-treatment claim.328 At the prima facie 
case stage, a worker could prove “that she belongs to the protected class, 
that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate 
her, and that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their abil-
ity or inability to work.’”329 If the employer offered a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the exclusion, a worker could raise an inference of 
pretext by showing that a policy created “a significant burden on preg-
nant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ 
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden.”330 To show a 
material issue of fact as to whether a burden exists, a worker could 
demonstrate that “the employer accommodates a large percentage of 
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of 
pregnant workers.”331  
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito analyzed in greater depth 
to whom pregnant workers could be compared as part of individual dis-
parate-treatment analysis.332 Alito concluded that “pregnant employees 
must be compared with employees performing the same or very similar 
jobs.”333 Alito also offered some clues about how such a comparison 
would unfold by analyzing one of UPS’s accommodations.334 The com-
pany had accommodated drivers who lost their DOT certification.335 UPS 
and the Fourth Circuit distinguished pregnant workers from those ac-
commodated on two bases. First, workers who lost DOT certification 
faced a legal obstacle while pregnant workers did not.336 Second, workers 
without DOT certification theoretically still had the ability to perform a 
variety of physical tasks that pregnant women requiring accommodation 
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did not.337 For Alito, neither of these distinctions made sense.338 At least 
on some occasions, workers losing DOT certification would have the 
same incapacity to work as pregnant employees.339 UPS offered no ex-
planation as to why pregnant drivers did not receive accommodations 
afforded to other workers.340 
Where do pregnancy-blind policies stand in the aftermath of Young? 
This Part next explores the impact of Young on three strategies available 
to pregnant workers: those involving disparate treatment, disparate im-
pact, and disability under the ADA. By providing a partial roadmap for 
workers challenging pregnancy-blind policies, Young will make it easier 
to bring disparate-treatment claims. At the same time, by reinforcing the 
idea that providing workers meaningful choice constitutes impermissible 
“special treatment,” Young exposes the persistent disadvantages of using 
litigation to protect pregnant workers.  
C. Individual Disparate Treatment Claims 
After Young, employees will most likely challenge pregnancy-blind 
policies using either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. In di-
rect-evidence cases,341 employees have conventionally (and unsuccess-
fully) turned to light-work policies themselves as proof of discriminatory 
intent.342 The logic here is straightforward: employers use light-work 
policies that, by their very terms, exclude all pregnant women from ac-
commodations available to employees similarly able (or unable) to work. 
Prior to Young, the circuit courts refuted this logic by relying on a narrow 
definition of who counts as a proper comparator for pregnant women.343 
In particular, courts compare pregnant women to other workers on the 
basis of the source of their injury or disability, rather than their capacity 
to work. On their face, pregnancy-blind policies treat pregnant women 
the same as all other workers not injured on the job or not considered 
disabled under the terms of the ADA. 
Young is silent on whether pregnancy-blind policies can ever quali-
fy as direct evidence of discrimination, but the logic of the majority opin-
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ion stands in obvious tension with this argument. The Court explicitly 
allowed the employer to accommodate some workers with an identical 
inability to work while excluding pregnant workers so long as employers 
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for doing so.344 Under Young, 
without more, a policy denying accommodation to pregnant workers 
would likely not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. The fact of 
the discrimination would not change the analysis. What matters under 
Young is the employer’s motivation and intent.345  
Young will make a greater difference to the courts’ analysis under 
the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. In the lower courts, 
the central problem in light-work cases has involved the final element: 
whether denying light work to pregnant women creates a special burden 
or whether granting pregnant women light work constitutes special 
treatment.346  
Before Young, courts answering this question focused on who 
counts as a relevant comparator—a person “similarly situated” or nearly 
identical to a pregnant woman whom an employer treats more favora-
bly.347 Workers ask the court to compare workers in terms of their ability 
to do a job, while employers ask the courts to spotlight the cause of a 
worker’s disability.348 Again, for the most part, the courts endorsed the 
latter position.349  
On the rare occasions that women made it past the prima facie 
stage, employees tried to show that an employer’s purportedly neutral 
reason for using a pregnancy-blind policy was a pretext for sex discrimi-
nation.350 Before Young, proving pretext was hard. The Sixth Circuit 
rejected a PDA challenge because the employee lacked strong enough 
evidence that employers had adopted a pregnancy-blind policy for dis-
criminatory reasons.351 Establishing such an evidentiary foundation was 
often likely to be difficult and expensive. Employees might need to con-
duct “an examination of how the policy came to be enacted and why,” to 
locate “evidence about women’s status generally within the employer’s 
ranks,” and to conduct “interviews . . . [of] current and past employees 
about employer attitudes concerning pregnancy or women in the work-
place.”352 As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas recognize, however, 
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even workers who can bring forth this kind of evidence must counter 
arguments that they demand “special treatment.”353 
Young provides some reassurance for pregnant workers proceeding 
under McDonnell-Douglas. To make out a prima facie case, Young made 
clear that workers needed only to show that the employer accommodated 
other workers similar in their inability to work. If an employer adopts a 
pregnancy-blind policy that accommodates nonpregnant workers with 
similar physical disabilities, most lower courts would have rejected a 
disparate treatment claim out of hand. After Young, if an employer uses a 
similar pregnancy-blind policy, a worker should make it to the last step 
of the burden-shifting analysis.
Young also makes it easier for pregnant workers to show pretext. 
Both the majority and Justice Alito’s concurrence draw attention to the 
impact of an exclusionary policy and the stated reasons for it. If a policy 
excluded most pregnant workers while covering all others, the majority 
reasoned that a jury could reasonably infer a discriminatory intent, par-
ticularly when the employer’s justification did not seem strong enough to 
rationalize such a significant impact.354 Under Justice Alito’s approach, 
courts applying the burden-shifting framework would compare pregnant 
workers to others assigned the same job and similar in their inability to 
work. Alito’s skepticism about UPS’s accommodation of workers who 
lost their DOT certification stemmed from the kind of mismatch between 
the employer’s stated means and ends that troubled the majority. At least 
some of the time, pregnant workers and drivers without DOT certifica-
tion could perform the same tasks. For Alito, UPS had simply not offered 
a good enough reason for providing an accommodation to the latter 
group of workers while denying one to the former. 
Just the same, after Young, real obstacles still stand in the way of 
pregnant workers relying on individual disparate treatment. The majori-
ty’s reasoning presupposes that there are nondiscriminatory reasons for 
treating pregnant workers differently beyond their inability to perform 
certain tasks.355 The Court specifically mentioned distinctions based on 
“special duties, special service, or special needs,” but left the door open 
for employers to identify more nondiscriminatory reasons to single out 
pregnant workers.356 As a result, Young still allows employers to circum-
vent the principle of meaningful choice written into the PDA. Under the 
PDA, after choosing to accommodate any employee, the employer can 
exclude pregnant workers only if they differ from others in their inability 
to perform certain tasks. By allowing employers more room to exclude 
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pregnant workers, Young still does too little to guard against the burdens 
on reproductive decision-making targeted by the PDA.  
To defeat a plaintiff’s claim at the summary judgment stage after 
Young, an employer may simply have to offer a persuasive reason for 
leaving pregnant workers out. The majority countenanced the possibility 
that some pregnancy-blind policies—including UPS’s own rules—would 
pass muster.357 Young makes clear that as a policy more heavily burdens 
pregnant women, employers must bring forth more persuasive reasons 
for discriminating.358 However, the burden on pregnant workers is rela-
tive. If employers exclude all pregnant workers and many nonpregnant 
workers, the kind of significant burden that the Young Court describes 
may not exist. Even a burden as onerous as the one created by UPS may 
still survive as long as the employer makes a sufficiently compelling 
argument for it. Theoretically, employers could have good reason to re-
ward only those injured on the job for the hazard incurred during service. 
Accommodations for those injured on the job effectively exclude all 
pregnant women, but under Young, such a defect may not be fatal. For 
Justice Alito, a pregnancy-blind policy excluding workers who do not 
have a disability under the ADA would present no problem under the 
PDA.359 After Young, pregnancy-blind policies will less often absolve 
employers of responsibility for pregnancy discrimination. However, giv-
en the circuit courts’ receptivity to these policies, Young still allows em-
ployers to treat pregnant workers differently because of the source of 
their disability—their pregnancy. 
Worse, Young reinforced the “most-favored-nation” reasoning un-
derlying the lower courts’ treatment of pregnancy-blind policies.360 Both 
the majority and concurrence reasoned that the PDA could not require 
employers to treat pregnant women the same as others based on their 
inability to work without requiring the kind of special treatment Title VII 
prohibits.361  
The reproductive-liberty analysis favored by feminists and pro-lifers 
in the 1970s may help workers overcome the hurdles created by Young. 
Presenting the law as a protection against special burdens on reproduc-
tive liberty gave both movement and countermovement activists in the 
1970s a way out of the reverse-discrimination dilemma. Activists suc-
cessfully reframed the PDA as a protection against special burdens on 
women’s reproductive liberty rather than a guarantee of preferential 
treatment.  
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Now, reviving the liberty analysis used in the PDA debate may also 
help the courts understand individual disparate treatment analysis in dif-
ferent terms. Under Young, at the pretext stage, the courts effectively 
balance competing considerations, evaluating the strength of an employ-
er’s justification against the impact a policy has on pregnant women. 
That impact should include not only the number of women affected by a 
policy but also the burden on reproductive decision-making that a policy 
imposes. Giving employers an out so long as they exclude a sufficient 
number of nonpregnant workers does nothing to remedy the special bur-
den prohibited by the PDA. Nor should many justifications for excluding 
pregnant workers be considered sufficiently weighty to justify the repro-
ductive burden inherent in pregnancy-blind policies. To define compara-
tors too narrowly would once again ensure, contrary to the intent of the 
PDA, that “women workers would face serious obstacles to continuing 
their pregnancy and maintaining their jobs at the same time.”362 
Justice Alito suggested that UPS’s policy of accommodating only 
disabled employees would likely qualify as a sufficient, nondiscriminato-
ry purpose under Young.363 However, the majority mentioned that the 
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 might change the 
courts’ analysis of whether pregnancy itself may constitute a disability. 
This Part turns next to the disability-discrimination challenges that may 
be available to pregnant workers after Young.  
D. Pregnancy as a Disability Under the ADAAA 
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of qualified disabil-
ity status and demands that employers provide “reasonable accommoda-
tions” for qualified individuals unless doing so would impose an “undue 
hardship.”364 The ADA treats an individual as disabled when she either 
has or is regarded as having “a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”365 
After the Supreme Court substantially narrowed the definition of a quali-
fying disability, Congress responded by enacting the 2008 ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA).366 The ADAAA clarified that the statutory 
definition of disability should be “construed in favor of broad coverage” 
and explicitly repudiated the Court’s prior interpretations.367 The 
ADAAA also required a court to treat a condition as a disability regard-
less of the effect of mitigating measures, such as medication or hearing 
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aids, and regardless of the fact that a condition was episodic or in remis-
sion.368 
As Jeannette Cox has shown, the ADAAA provides a strong foun-
dation for efforts to define “normal” pregnancy, and not just pregnancy 
complications, as a disability.369 The ADAAA makes explicit that “im-
pairment[s]” that cause “substantial” limitations in “walking, standing,  
. . . lifting, [or] bending” qualify as disabilities.370   
Although the ADAAA has significantly expanded the definition of a 
disability, the few courts to consider the issue have responded with am-
bivalence to claims that “normal” or even “abnormal” pregnancy counts 
as a qualified disability.371 Consider, for example, the case of Victoria 
Serednyj, an activity director at a nursing home operated by Beverly 
Healthcare, LLC (Beverly).372 Serednyj’s job sometimes required her to 
perform physical tasks, like rearranging chairs, transporting residents to 
activities, or carrying shopping bags.373 Serednyj had previously suffered 
a miscarriage, and when she became pregnant again, she had complica-
tions that required her to avoid strenuous physical labor.374 Her employer 
refused to transfer her to a light-duty position because she had not been 
injured on the job.375 
Serednyj argued, among other things, that Beverly’s failure to grant 
her request constituted both disability discrimination and a failure to ac-
commodate under the ADA, since her pregnancy prevented her from 
doing daily tasks like bending and lifting.376 While acknowledging that 
pregnancy may count as a physical impairment, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that Serednyj could not show that her impairment “substantially 
limited” a “major life activity.”377 Finding that “[p]regnancy is, by its 
very nature, of limited duration” and that “any complications which arise 
from a pregnancy generally dissipate once a woman gives birth,” the 
Seventh Circuit rejected Serednyj’s claim.378 Regardless of the impact of 
the ADAAA, as Serednyj shows, courts may reject any disability claim 
based on the fact that pregnancy and its complications have only a tem-
porary effect. 
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Young itself offers few clues about how the Court would view 
claims that pregnancy would constitute a disability after the ADA 
Amendments Act. Just the same, the history provided here bolsters Cox’s 
analysis. During the battle for the PDA, business lobbyists urged Con-
gress to distinguish “normal” pregnancy from other disabilities because it 
was temporary and (at least often) voluntary. Reproductive-liberty analy-
sis allowed legislators to see through this argument. Assume that an em-
ployer wishes to accommodate only nonpregnant workers. She can do so 
as long as she does not formally categorize workers on the basis of preg-
nancy or related conditions. Achieving the same result—excluding preg-
nant workers from generally available accommodations—would be easy. 
Accommodating only workers injured on the job effectively disqualifies 
any pregnancy-based request, since women rarely conceive at work. To 
be sure, the PDA did not require employers who provided no accommo-
dations to do so for pregnant employees.379 However, as the Article 
shows, the diverse constituencies supporting the PDA did demand that 
pregnant women be judged on their ability to work, not their pregnan-
cy—the “source” of their disability. Ignoring this consensus allows em-
ployers to burden women’s reproductive decisions in precisely the way 
the PDA forbids.  
E. Disparate Impact Claims 
Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas point to the promise of dis-
parate impact claims for women challenging pregnancy-blind policies.380 
Because the plaintiff did not explicitly pursue such a claim, Young did 
not consider the merits of such a strategy. To make out a prima facie 
case, workers must show a specific and identifiable employment practice 
(here, a pregnancy-blind policy) that had a statistically significant effect 
on a protected class.381 As Grossman and Thomas recognize, the courts 
appear to have loosened the evidentiary burden in the light-duty context, 
allowing pregnant workers to rely on general statistics about “the number 
of women who can be expected to become pregnant during their working 
lives . . . as well as the extensive literature concerning pregnancy’s phys-
ical effects.”382 
However, the disparate-impact theory mostly remains untested, 
since courts have not yet fully addressed the employer’s business neces-
sity defense: that is, whether pregnancy-blind policies are job-related and 
serve a business necessity.383 Grossman and Thomas convincingly argue 
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against several likely defenses, including claims based on cost and the 
volume of available, “real” light work.384  
However, the biggest problem with disparate impact claims may lie 
in the “special treatment” trap set by early opponents of the PDA and 
reinforced by the Young majority. The Urbano Court concluded that Ti-
tle VII forbids all policies that are not pregnancy blind.385 By granting 
women a benefit that men could not receive, as the courts concluded, the 
employer may discriminate on the basis of sex.386 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano387 reinforces this analysis of pregnancy-
based accommodations. Although decided in the context of race discrim-
ination, Ricci expressed skepticism about the legality of affirmative ef-
forts on the part of the employer to address disparate impacts, particular-
ly when those efforts resemble “reverse discrimination.”388 In that case, 
the City of New Haven set aside the results of a written test for the pro-
motion of city firefighters since it had a racially disparate impact.389 Ap-
plying the strong-basis-in-the-evidence standard from equal-protection 
jurisprudence, the Court held that New Haven’s decision constituted im-
permissible treatment under Title VII.390 
Scholars read Ricci in a variety of ways: from suggesting that the 
Court requires color- (or pregnancy-) blindness in all but the rarest cases 
to arguing that Ricci creates a new defense for employers in disparate-
impact cases who were not aware that a policy would have a disparate 
impact.391 What seems clear is that Ricci narrowed the scope of dispar-
ate-impact claims, providing a powerful weapon for those who frame 
pregnancy accommodation as special treatment. On its face, Young offers 
little comfort to those relying on a disparate-impact theory. The majority 
and concurrence give ammunition to employers framing requests for 
accommodations as demands for “most-favored nation status.” 
The liberty analysis set forth here may help strengthen the case for 
disparate impact in a post-Ricci world. In debate surrounding the PDA, 
feminists and pro-lifers convinced members of Congress that demands 
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for “special treatment” in fact constituted calls for protection against the 
unique burdens imposed on women balancing childbearing and careers. 
The federal courts—and the Supreme Court—should overrule deci-
sions relying on the principle of pregnancy blindness. The history of the 
PDA makes clear that it requires much more. Just the same, as the Part 
next explains, the courts may not be the most promising place to chal-
lenge pregnancy-blind policies. 
F. The Return to Legislative Constitutionalism  
The history of the battle for meaningful choice illustrates not only 
the constitutional values realized by the PDA but also the shortcomings 
of litigation as a tool for seeking accommodations for pregnant workers. 
Because of courts’ reliance on precedent, judicial decision-making re-
mains more path-dependent.392 As a conservative plurality on the Su-
preme Court reads color-blindness into the Equal Protection Clause, 
courts are more likely to view Title VII as a guarantee of sex and preg-
nancy blindness—one centered on formal equality and fundamentally 
opposed to any accommodations. The Young Court’s hostility to “special 
treatment” ignores the meaning and history of the PDA, but the Court’s 
discomfort with the very idea of accommodation flows naturally from 
recent Equal Protection and Title VII jurisprudence.  
Congress’s institutional advantages—an ability to work incremen-
tally, democratic accountability, and the capacity to create redistributive 
remedies—make the legislative arena a more promising place for con-
temporary proponents of meaningful choice. Superficially, Congress may 
not seem to be a promising place to do much of anything. Defined by 
gridlock, partisan polarization, and astonishingly low poll ratings, Con-
gress seems unlikely to advance any legislative agenda, let alone one 
related to either equality or liberty.393  
Moreover, an accommodation-centered policy has drawbacks of its 
own. Some scholars worry that an accommodation-centered policy 
would reinforce gender-paternalist attitudes or encourage employers to 
avoid hiring women in the first place.394 Michael Selmi, for example, has 
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argued that disparate-impact theory, an approach sympathetic to accom-
modation rights, has “stunted the evolution of a more robust definition of 
intentional discrimination.”395 Samuel Bagenstos contends that broad, 
structural, accommodation-centered remedies lack the “generally accept-
ed normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law.”396  
However, as the history presented here makes clear, the PDA mat-
tered to members of Congress and grassroots supporters because it 
helped to give meaning to important constitutional values surrounding 
reproductive liberty. As Joanna Grossman argues, an accommodation 
regime would “create a counter-narrative of a woman’s proper place.”397 
As importantly, an accommodation law would more accurately reflect 
the movement–countermovement consensus on reproductive liberty that 
emerged in debate on the PDA. A new legislative constitutional cam-
paign might represent the next logical step in the expression of those 
values.  
At a minimum, grassroots activists could pursue an amendment to 
the PDA prohibiting discrimination by pregnancy-blind policies. More 
ambitiously, feminists and antiabortion activists could pursue legislation 
like the proposed federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), a law 
that would force employers to make reasonable accommodations for 
pregnant workers much like those employers must make available to the 
disabled.398 The PWFA would make it unlawful for employers to deny 
accommodation to pregnant women unless doing so would represent an 
“undue hardship.”399 Seven states have already passed such accommoda-
tion legislation, as have some local governments like the New York City 
Council.400  
Legislative constitutionalism may well be the most promising path 
for legislators and grassroots activists who want to give further meaning 
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to the reproductive-liberty norm written into the PDA. Legislative consti-
tutionalism allowed feminists and antiabortion activists to make gradual 
progress in the realization of their constitutional commitments. Funda-
mentally, however, legal feminists and pro-lifers in the PDA battle con-
cluded that women required accommodation, not equal treatment, to ex-
ercise true reproductive liberty. The PDA requires only that employers 
treat pregnant women the same as other workers with similar physical 
limitations. A hirer can circumvent the PDA by providing no accommo-
dations at all. Obviously, such a policy may force a woman to choose 
between economic security and childbearing. So too may pregnancy-
blind policies. Indeed, amici on either side of the abortion issue recog-
nized the purpose of the PDA and unsuccessfully urged the Court to re-
quire employers to accommodate workers equally based on their inability 
to work rather than the source of their disability.401 To give meaning to 
the values embraced by the PDA, activists may have to turn once again 
to the legislative arena. 
CONCLUSION 
Arguments for reproductive choice have few supporters, but wide-
spread criticism of choice-based arguments in the courts has obscured 
their transformative potential. Dissatisfied with juridical constitutional-
ism, grassroots groups on either side of the abortion issue turned to Con-
gress in expressing their constitutional commitments. Choice served as 
the touchstone of demands to analyze reproductive liberty and sex 
equality as inextricably linked—demands that blurred the distinction 
between negative and positive rights. The PDA emerged from debate 
between antiabortion activists, feminists, and business lobbyists about 
the meaning of the right to choose and the remedies appropriate for vio-
lations of that right. The law represented an incremental step on the path 
to guaranteeing women meaningful, rather than formal, reproductive 
choice. 
Tracing the history of liberty norms and the PDA calls into question 
prevailing judicial interpretations of the protections the statute requires—
including the Court’s analysis in Young. But perhaps the fact that courts 
have relied on so narrow an interpretation of Title VII should come as no 
surprise. Now as before, for those seeking workplace fairness, the courts 
may not be the best place to look. 
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